NERC FFT Reports: Reliability Standard INT-006-3 | White & Case LLP International Law Firm, Global Law Practice
NERC FFT Reports: Reliability Standard INT-006-3

NERC FFT Reports: Reliability Standard INT-006-3

White & Case NERC Database

Find, Fix and Track Entity, FERC Docket No. RC12-1 (October 31, 2011)

Reliability Standard: INT-006-3

Requirement: R1

Region: FRCC

Issue: FFT Entity self-reported that it did not timely respond to 12 On-Time Requests for Interchange (RFI) over the course of two months.

Finding: FRCC found that the issue only constituted a minimal risk to BPS reliability since the delay in approving the tags (which generally was only a few minutes) only resulted in an economic only impact to only 12 RFI transactions of no more than 100 MW.

Find, Fix and Track Entity, FERC Docket No. RC12-6 (December 30, 2011)

Reliability Standard: INT-006-3

Requirement: R1

Region: FRCC

Issue: FFT Entity failed to respond in the required time – 10 minutes – to each Request for Interchange (RFI) and modifications to any RFIs, that were submitted between 15 minutes and one hour of the ramp start time of the Arranged Interchange. FFT discovered that electronic tags were allowed to expire in 24 instances before approvals (or a response) were made to transition an Arranged Interchange to a Confirmed Interchange. FFT Entity did not respond to an on- time RFI or adjusted RFI 21 of the 24 instances before the RFI expired. Another expired because FFT Entity did not respond to an on-time extension of the RFI and two were a termination or cancellation of an RFI.

Finding: FRCC found that, as only 24 tags expired in a one year period ranging from 18 MW to 220 MW, plus all 24 tags were under normal conditions, the issue posed a minimal and not serious or substantial risk to the reliability of the BPS. Furthermore, no RFIs were due to an emergency or a reliability adjustment and so only commercial transactions, not reliability transactions, were affected. Also, no reliability impacts from these events occurred.

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Docket No. RC12-12 (May 30, 2012)

Reliability Standard: INT-006-3

Requirement: R1

Region: SERC

Issue: TVA, in its role as a BA and TSP, submitted a self-report discussing that on four occasions it could not respond as required to curtailment requests within the 10 minute period set forth in the Standard due to computer or system malfunctions. TVA subsequently contacted the vendor and an updated software application was installed resolving the issue.

Finding: The issue was found to pose minimal risk to BPS reliability because of the small total number of hourly tag curtailment requests that TVA could not respond to (18 of 3,258), as well as the short duration involved in all instances (less than six hours). And, the curtailment requests were not affected by TVA’s inability to respond.