NERC FFT Reports: Reliability Standard PER-002-1 | White & Case LLP International Law Firm, Global Law Practice
NERC FFT Reports: Reliability Standard PER-002-1

NERC FFT Reports: Reliability Standard PER-002-1

White & Case NERC Database

City of Vero Beach (VERO), Docket No. RC13-9, May 30, 2013

Reliability Standard: PER-002-1

Requirement: 2; 2.1

Region: FRCC

Issue: Further to a Compliance Audit, FRCC determined that VERO had an issue with PER-002-1 R2.1 when it found that VERO could not provide sufficient evidence to show that it had a training program for all operating personnel in positions of primary responsibility for the real-time operation of the interconnected Bulk Electric System (BES). In particular, the supervisor of the transmission and distribution system operations was not listed in the training program as an individual requiring training.

Finding: FRCC determined that the issue posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the BPS because the individual concerned did indeed receive the training at hand, even if the training program did not specify that it was required for such individual. Furthermore, the risk to the reliability of the BPS was diminished because VERO is a municipal with less than 1% of regional transmission serving 210 MW peak load and with no registered generation.

City of Vero Beach (VERO), Docket No. RC13-9, May 30, 2013

Reliability Standard: PER-002-1

Requirement: 4

Region: FRCC

Issue: Further to a Compliance Audit, FRCC determined that VERO had an issue with PER-002-1 R4 when it found that VERO could not provide sufficient evidence to show that personnel identified in the standard had been provided with at least five days per year of training and drills using realistic simulations of system emergencies, in addition to other required training. In particular, due to a miscalculation of the hours of training completed by each system operator, two of six system operators had completed only 26.5 hours of the required 32 hours using realistic simulations of system emergencies in 2010.

Finding: FRCC determined that the issue posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the BPS because VERO is situated within a larger BA/TOP footprint (Florida Power & Light Company), and the employees at issue were long-term employees who had been working for VERO since 1996 and 2006, respectively. Any errors that might arise from the error would most likely have impacted only VERO’s own load and non-registered generation. Furthermore, the training hours for these employees were met in both 2009 and 2011, and the employees were only lacking 5.5 hours of training in 2010.