NERC FFT Reports: Reliability Standard PRC-004-1 | White & Case LLP International Law Firm, Global Law Practice
NERC FFT Reports: Reliability Standard PRC-004-1

NERC FFT Reports: Reliability Standard PRC-004-1

White & Case NERC Database

This page contains the FFT (Find, Fix and Track) summaries. Click here to read the NOP (Notice of Penalty)/ACP (Administrative Citation of Penalty) summaries.

Find, Fix and Track Entity, Docket No. RC11-6 (September 30, 2011)

Reliability Standard: PRC-004-1

Requirement: R1

Region: FRCC

Issue: During a compliance audit, FRCC found that a disturbance report from FFT Entity (analyzing a relay switch misoperation) did not include a corrective action plan it would undertake to avoid similar misoperations in the future.

Finding: FRCC found that this issue constituted only a minimal risk to BPS reliability since FFT Entity had actually checked its system for faulty wired relays that could potentially cause future misoperations. Tests on the system relays verified that there were no similar faulty wiring issues elsewhere on FFT Entity’s system. Furthermore, FFT Entity is a relatively small entity.

Find, Fix and Track Entity, Docket No. RC11-6 (September 30, 2011)

Reliability Standard: PRC-004-1

Requirement: R1, R2

Region: SPP

Issue: FFT Entity self-certified that its procedures for analyzing and mitigating transmission and generation Protection System Misoperations did not incorporate procedures for all potential misoperations to be logged, monitored and evaluated as required (R1, R2). The procedures did not identify responsible personnel and did not clearly define what would constitute a misoperation.

Finding: SPP found that these issues constituted a moderate risk to BPS reliability since FFT Entity was not evaluating all of its potential misoperations. This could have led to recurring misoperations that were not corrected, with relevant devices not operating appropriately when needed.

Find, Fix and Track Entity, FERC Docket No. RC12-1 (October 31, 2011)

Reliability Standard: PRC-004-1

Requirement: R3

Region: MRO

Issue: During a compliance audit, MRO found that FFT Entity and its member entity did not submit documentation to MRO, as required, on its misoperations analyses and corrective action plan regarding a Protection System misoperation of a relay that occurred on August 29, 2009.

Finding: MRO found that the issue constituted a minimal risk to BPS reliability since the member entity did actually conduct the required analyses and enacted a corrective action plan.

Find, Fix, Track and Report, Docket No. RC12-2 (November 30, 2011)

Reliability Standard: PRC-004-1

Requirement: R3

Region: RFC

Issue: FFT Entity self-reported that it had not timely reported to RFC a misoperation where a relay operated when it should not have because its set point was lower than it should have been. FFT Entity completed all analysis and remedial actions five days later; however, due to an improper data query in its reporting spreadsheet, the entity failed to submit its Misoperation analysis and Corrective Action Plan to ReliabilityFirst until six months past the due date.

Finding: RFC determined that this issue posed a minimal risk and did not pose a serious or substantial risk to the reliability of the BPS, however, the risk was mitigated by the fact that FFT Entity had completed its Misoperation analysis and Corrective Action Plan five days after the Misoperation. The issue occurred because an improper data query in FFT Entity’s reporting spreadsheet left out the Misoperation from the report to RFC.

GIM Channelview Cogeneration LLC (GIM Channelview), Docket No. RC13-10, June 27, 2013

Reliability Standard: PRC-004-1

Requirement: R3

Region: TRE

Issue: Further to a Compliance Audit, TRE determined that GIM Channelview, as a GO, had an issue with PRC-004-1 R3 when it found that the GO had not reported a misoperation when one of its units had a fuse failure trip to the Regional Reliability Organization (RRO). Subsequent analysis showed that the failure was caused by a defective fuse on the C-phase potential transformer and that the incident was an unintentional Protection System operation when no fault or other abnormal condition had occurred. It was unrelated to on-site maintenance and testing activity.

Finding: TRE determined that the issue posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the BPS because the GO took corrective action at the time of the incident by replacing the defective fuse on the C-phase potential transformer, and conducting a root cause analysis, and immediately documented such corrective action and analysis.