Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Severe
Region: SERC
Issue: Further to a compliance audit, SERC reported a violation of R1 after discovering that APGI-Tapoco, as a TOP, had an Emergency Operations Plan ("Plan") that did not include eight of the nine requirements for restoration plans in Attachment 1-EOP-005. Specifically, the Plan did not describe the relationships between or the responsibilities of the personnel needed for system restoration; it did not address the power supplies needed for its blackstart, nor did it address communication adequacy and protocol; it failed to plan for a contingency in the event that the Plan could not be executed ; it failed to provide operating instructions for restoring loads; it omitted simulation and testing procedures for verifying the Plan resources and procedures; it failed to include a plan for retaining records of relevant annual personnel training and exercises; it did not include functions pertaining to coordination with and among RCs and neighboring TOPs; and it failed to provide for notification of other operating entities during the implementation process.
Finding: SERC determined that the R1 violation posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the BPS because the load being served was only internal APGI-Tapoco load, making restoration a business interruption factor for the company, and the TOP's generation had not been deemed critical to the reliability of the BPS nor was it designated as a component of the BA's or RC's overall system blackstart plan. Furthermore, the TOP's Plan included a systems overview, an authority and coordination contact list, a list of related TOPs and BAs, and an approach to interconnection emergencies. SERC and APGI-Tapoco entered into a settlement agreement to resolve multiple violations, whereby APGI-Tapoco agreed to pay a penalty and to undertake other mitigation measures to come into compliance with R1. SERC considered Alcoa Inc's FERC Compliance Policy and Plan (which governs APGI-Tapoco) a mitigating factor in making its penalty determination. The duration of the violation was from June 18, 2007 through December 12, 2011. APGI-Tapoco neither admits nor denies the R1 violation.
Penalty: $11,000 (aggregate for 12 violations)
FERC Order: Issued December 28, 2012 (no further review)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R2
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Moderate
Region: SERC
Issue: Further to a compliance audit, SERC reported a violation of R2 after discovering that APGI-Tapoco, as a TOP, could not demonstrate that it had consistently reviewed and updated its restoration plan on an annual basis since the initial procedure became effective in May 2007. In particular, while revisions had been made in 2007, 2009 and 2010, the TOP's records revealed a gap in 2008.
Finding: SERC determined that the R2 violation posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the BPS because the review had been missed only by 5 months, the load being served was only internal APGI-Tapoco load, making restoration a business interruption factor for the company, and the TOP's generation had not been deemed critical to the reliability of the BPS nor was it designated as a component of the BA's or RC's overall system blackstart plan. SERC and APGI-Tapoco entered into a settlement agreement to resolve multiple violations, whereby APGI-Tapoco agreed to pay a penalty and to undertake other mitigation measures to come into compliance with R2. SERC considered Alcoa Inc's FERC Compliance Policy and Plan (which governs APGI-Tapoco) a mitigating factor in making its penalty determination. The duration of the violation was from September 30, 2008 through February 9, 2009. APGI-Tapoco neither admits nor denies the R2 violation.
Penalty: $11,000 (aggregate for 12 violations)
FERC Order: Issued December 28, 2012 (no further review)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R4
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Severe
Region: SERC
Issue: Further to a compliance audit, SERC reported a violation of R4 after discovering that APGI-Tapoco, as a TOP, could not provide evidence that it had coordinated its restoration plans with certain required entities. Specifically, although the TOP's plans provided for coordination between the TOP and GOP, its plan did not provide for coordination with the BAs in its area, its RC, and neighboring TOPs and BAs, as required by the regulation.
Finding: SERC determined that the R4 violation posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the BPS because the load being served was only internal APGI-Tapoco load, making restoration a business interruption factor for the company, and the TOP's generation had not been deemed critical to the reliability of the BPS nor was it designated as a component of the BA's or RC's overall system blackstart plan. In addition, the TOP's existing system restoration plan included a systems overview, an authority and coordination contact list, a list of related TOPs and BAs, and an approach to interconnection emergencies. SERC and APGI-Tapoco entered into a settlement agreement to resolve multiple violations, whereby APGI-Tapoco agreed to pay a penalty and to undertake other mitigation measures to come into compliance with R4. SERC considered Alcoa Inc's FERC Compliance Policy and Plan (which governs APGI-Tapoco) a mitigating factor in making its penalty determination. The duration of the violation was from June 18, 2007 through December 12, 2011. APGI-Tapoco neither admits nor denies the R4 violation.
Penalty: $11,000 (aggregate for 12 violations)
FERC Order: Issued December 28, 2012 (no further review)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R5
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: High
Region: SERC
Issue: Further to a compliance audit, SERC reported a violation of R5 when APGI-Tapoco, as a TOP, failed to provide evidence of periodic testing of its communications facilities needed for its restoration plan. Specifically, the TOP could not provide evidence that it had periodically tested its land line, its private branch exchange phone system, a satellite phone and a radio system, all of which are needed for proper communication, according to its Emergency Operations Plan.
Finding: SERC determined that the R5 violation posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the BPS because three of the four telecommunications devices listed in its Emergency Operations Plan were used on a regular basis during non-emergencies, and any issues with those systems would have been identified promptly. In addition, the load being served was only internal APGI-Tapoco load, making restoration a business interruption factor for the company, and the TOP's generation had not been deemed critical to the reliability of the BPS nor was it designated as a component of the BA's or RC's overall system blackstart plan. SERC and APGI-Tapoco entered into a settlement agreement to resolve multiple violations, whereby APGI-Tapoco agreed to pay a penalty and to undertake other mitigation measures to come into compliance with R5. SERC considered Alcoa Inc's FERC Compliance Policy and Plan (which governs APGI-Tapoco) a mitigating factor in making its penalty determination. The duration of the violation was from June 18, 2007 through December 12, 2011. APGI-Tapoco neither admits nor denies the R5 violation.
Penalty: $11,000 (aggregate for 12 violations)
FERC Order: Issued December 28, 2012 (no further review)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R6
Violation Risk Factor: High
Violation Severity Level: Severe
Region: SERC
Issue: Further to a compliance audit, SERC reported a violation of R6 when APGI-Tapoco, as a TOP, could not provide evidence that its operating personnel had been trained to implement the restoration plan. The only reference to training in the Emergency Operations Plan was a statement that the annual dispatcher training included a review of the restoration plan.
Finding: SERC determined that the R6 violation posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the BPS because the load being served was only internal APGI-Tapoco load, making restoration a business interruption factor for the company, and the TOP's generation had not been deemed critical to the reliability of the BPS nor was it designated as a component of the BA's or RC's overall system blackstart plan. SERC and APGI-Tapoco entered into a settlement agreement to resolve multiple violations, whereby APGI-Tapoco agreed to pay a penalty and to undertake other mitigation measures to come into compliance with R6. SERC considered Alcoa Inc's FERC Compliance Policy and Plan (which governs APGI-Tapoco) a mitigating factor in making its penalty determination. The duration of the violation was from June 18, 2007 through December 12, 2011. APGI-Tapoco neither admits nor denies the R6 violation.
Penalty: $11,000 (aggregate for 12 violations)
FERC Order: Issued December 28, 2012 (no further review)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R7
Violation Risk Factor: High
Violation Severity Level: Severe
Region: SERC
Issue: Further to a compliance audit, SERC reported a violation of R7 when APGI-Tapoco, as a TOP, failed to provide evidence that it had actually tested or simulated its restoration procedure as required. The TOP's Emergency Operations Plan stated that the plan had been tested and verified through startup from local sources. It also stated that an isolated re-start, independent of interconnection supply, could be successfully completed. The TOP could not, however, produce any evidence of actual testing or simulation.
Finding: SERC determined that the R7 violation posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the BPS because the load being served was only internal APGI-Tapoco load, making restoration a business interruption factor for the company, and the TOP's generation had not been deemed critical to the reliability of the BPS nor was it designated as a component of the BA's or RC's overall system blackstart plan. In addition, the TOP's existing system restoration plan included a systems overview, an authority and coordination contact list, a list of related TOPs and BAs, and an approach to interconnection emergencies. SERC and APGI-Tapoco entered into a settlement agreement to resolve multiple violations, whereby APGI-Tapoco agreed to pay a penalty and to undertake other mitigation measures to come into compliance with R7. SERC considered Alcoa Inc's FERC Compliance Policy and Plan (which governs APGI-Tapoco) a mitigating factor in making its penalty determination. The duration of the violation was from June 18, 2007 through December 12, 2011. APGI-Tapoco neither admits nor denies the R7 violation.
Penalty: $11,000 (aggregate for 12 violations)
FERC Order: Issued December 28, 2012 (no further review)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Severe
Region: SERC
Issue: Further to a compliance audit, SERC reported a violation of R1 after discovering that APGI-Yadkin, as a TOP, had an Emergency Operations Plan ("Plan") that did not include seven of the nine requirements for restoration plans in Attachment 1-EOP-005. Specifically, the Plan did not describe the relationships between or the responsibilities of the personnel needed for system restoration; it did not address the power supplies needed for its blackstart, nor did it address communication adequacy and protocol; it failed to plan for a contingency in the event that the Plan could not be executed ; it omitted simulation and testing procedures for verifying the Plan resources and procedures; it failed to include a plan for retaining records of relevant annual personnel training and exercises; it did not include functions pertaining to coordination with and among RCs; and it failed to provide for notification of other operating entities during the implementation process.
Finding: SERC determined that the R1 violation posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the BPS because the load being served was only internal APGI-Yadkin load, making restoration a business interruption factor for the company, and the TOP's generation had not been deemed critical to the reliability of the BPS nor was it designated as a component of the BA's or RC's overall system blackstart plan. SERC and APGI-Yadkin entered into a settlement agreement to resolve multiple violations, whereby APGI-Yadkin agreed to pay a penalty and to undertake other mitigation measures to come into compliance with R1. In addition, the TOP's existing system restoration plan included a systems overview, an authority and coordination contact list, a list of related TOPs and BAs, and an approach to interconnection emergencies. SERC and APGI-Yadkin entered into a settlement agreement to resolve multiple violations, whereby APGI-Yadkin agreed to pay a penalty and to undertake other mitigation measures to come into compliance with R1. SERC considered Alcoa Inc's FERC Compliance Policy and Plan (which governs APGI-Yadkin) a mitigating factor in making its penalty determination. The duration of the violation was from June 18, 2007 through November 28, 2011. APGI-Yadkin neither admits nor denies the R1 violation.
Penalty: $13,000 (aggregate for 12 violations)
FERC Order: Issued December 28, 2012 (no further review)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R2
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Moderate
Region: SERC
Issue: Further to a compliance audit, SERC reported a violation of R2 after discovering that APGI-Yadkin, as a TOP, could not demonstrate that it had consistently reviewed and updated its restoration plan on an annual basis since the initial procedure became effective in September 2006. In particular, while revisions had been made in 2008 and 2010, the TOP's records revealed gaps in 2007 and 2009.
Finding: SERC determined that the R2 violation posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the BPS because the review had been missed only by 5 months, the load being served was only internal APGI-Yadkin load, making restoration a business interruption factor for the company, and the TOP's generation had not been deemed critical to the reliability of the BPS nor was it designated as a component of the BA's or RC's overall system blackstart plan. SERC and APGI-Yadkin entered into a settlement agreement to resolve multiple violations, whereby APGI-Yadkin agreed to pay a penalty and to undertake other mitigation measures to come into compliance with R2. SERC considered Alcoa Inc's FERC Compliance Policy and Plan (which governs APGI-Yadkin) a mitigating factor in making its penalty determination. The duration of the violation was from January 1, 2008 through May 4, 2012. APGI-Yadkin neither admits nor denies the R2 violation.
Penalty: $13,000 (aggregate for 12 violations)
FERC Order: Issued December 28, 2012 (no further review)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R3
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Severe
Region: SERC
Issue: Further to a compliance audit, SERC reported a violation of R3 after discovering that APGI-Yadkin, as a TOP, had not developed its restoration plan with a priority of restoring the integrity of the Interconnection. Although the TOPs initial procedure in 2006 and revisions through 2010 prioritized restoration of the integrity of the Interconnection, its revision in October 2011 failed to do so. The TOP's subsequent revision in November 2011 once again addressed the restoration of the integrity of the Interconnection as a priority.
Finding: SERC determined that the R3 violation posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the BPS because the TOP had been out of compliance for only, the load being served was only internal APGI-Yadkin load, making restoration a business interruption factor for the company, and the TOP's generation had not been deemed critical to the reliability of the BPS nor was it designated as a component of the RC's overall system blackstart plan. SERC and APGI-Yadkin entered into a settlement agreement to resolve multiple violations, whereby APGI-Yadkin agreed to pay a penalty and to undertake other mitigation measures to come into compliance with R3. SERC considered Alcoa Inc's FERC Compliance Policy and Plan (which governs APGI-Yadkin) a mitigating factor in making its penalty determination. The duration of the violation was from October 24, 2011 through November 17, 2011. APGI-Yadkin neither admits nor denies the R3 violation.
Penalty: $13,000 (aggregate for 12 violations)
FERC Order: Issued December 28, 2012 (no further review)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R5
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: High
Region: SERC
Issue: Further to a compliance audit, SERC reported a violation of R5 when APGI-Yadkin, as a BA and TOP, failed to provide evidence of periodic testing of its communications facilities needed for its restoration plan. Specifically, the BA and TOP could not provide information verifying that it had periodically tested its land line, its private branch exchange phone system, a satellite phone and a radio system, all of which are needed for proper communication, according to its Emergency Operations Plan.
Finding: SERC determined that the R5 violation posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the BPS because three of the four telecommunications devices listed in its Emergency Operations Plan were used on a regular basis during non-emergencies, and any issues with those systems would have been identified promptly. In addition, the load being served was only internal APGI-Yadkin load, making restoration a business interruption factor for the company, and the company's generation had not been deemed critical to the reliability of the BPS nor was it designated as a component of the RC's overall system blackstart plan. SERC and APGI-Yadkin entered into a settlement agreement to resolve multiple violations, whereby APGI-Yadkin agreed to pay a penalty and to undertake other mitigation measures to come into compliance with R5. SERC considered Alcoa Inc's FERC Compliance Policy and Plan (which governs APGI-Yadkin) a mitigating factor in making its penalty determination. The duration of the violation was from June 18, 2007 through November 28, 2011. APGI-Yadkin neither admits nor denies the R5 violation.
Penalty: $13,000 (aggregate for 12 violations)
FERC Order: Issued December 28, 2012 (no further review)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R6
Violation Risk Factor: High
Violation Severity Level: Severe
Region: SERC
Issue: Further to a compliance audit, SERC reported a violation of R6 when APGI-Tapoco, as a BA and TOP, could not provide evidence that its operating personnel had been trained to implement the restoration plan. APGI-Yadkin's Emergency Operations Plan does not address training, and the company was unable to verify that operating personnel had indeed been trained.
Finding: SERC determined that the R6 violation posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the BPS because the load being served was only internal APGI-Tapoco load, making restoration a business interruption factor for the company, and the company's generation had not been deemed critical to the reliability of the BPS nor was it designated as a component of the RC's overall system blackstart plan. SERC and APGI-Tapoco entered into a settlement agreement to resolve multiple violations, whereby APGI-Tapoco agreed to pay a penalty and to undertake other mitigation measures to come into compliance with R6. SERC considered Alcoa Inc's FERC Compliance Policy and Plan (which governs APGI-Yadkin) a mitigating factor in making its penalty determination. The duration of the violation was from June 18, 2007 through December 12, 2011. APGI-Yadkin neither admits nor denies the R6 violation.
Penalty: $13,000 (aggregate for 12 violations)
FERC Order: Issued December 28, 2012 (no further review)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R7
Violation Risk Factor: High
Violation Severity Level: Severe
Region: SERC
Issue: Further to a compliance audit, SERC reported a violation of R7 when APGI-Yadkin, as a BA and TOP, failed to provide evidence that it had actually tested or simulated its restoration procedure as required. APGI-Yadkin's Emergency Operations Plan did not include efforts to verify the plan through testing or simulation, nor could the company produce any evidence of actual testing or simulation.
Finding: SERC determined that the R7 violation posed a minimal risk to the reliability of the BPS because the load being served was only internal APGI-Yadkin load, making restoration a business interruption factor for the company, and the company's generation had not been deemed critical to the reliability of the BPS nor was it designated as a component of the RC's overall system blackstart plan. In addition, the APGI-Yadkin's existing system restoration plan included a systems overview, an authority and coordination contact list, a list of related TOPs and BAs, and an approach to interconnection emergencies. SERC and APGI-Yadkin entered into a settlement agreement to resolve multiple violations, whereby APGI-Yadkin agreed to pay a penalty and to undertake other mitigation measures to come into compliance with R7. SERC considered Alcoa Inc's FERC Compliance Policy and Plan (which governs APGI-Yadkin) a mitigating factor in making its penalty determination. The duration of the violation was from June 18, 2007 through December 12, 2011. APGI-Yadkin neither admits nor denies the R7 violation.
Penalty: $13,000 (aggregate for 12 violations)
FERC Order: Issued December 28, 2012 (no further review)
Arlington Valley, LLC - AVBA, FERC Docket No. NP13-9 (December 31, 2012)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Violation Risk Factor: Medium (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), High (6, 7)
Violation Severity Level: Severe (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
Region: WECC
Issue: AVBA, self-reported, as a TOP, that it did not possess plans that sufficiently covered system restoration for interconnected transmission facilities. According to AVBA, it has historically viewed itself as a part of the Salt River Project's (SRP) restoration plan and relies on SRP, an interconnected TOP, to perform the necessary system restoration activities (1). As AVBA did not have a separate transmission system restoration plan addressing plans and actions for restoring its interconnection facilities, it was not reviewing or updating its restoration plans as required (2) or prioritizing restoring the integrity of the interconnection (3). AVBA was also not coordinating its restoration plans with area GOs and Balancing Authorities, its Reliability Coordinator and neighboring TOPs and Balancing Authorities (4) and had not performed the required tests on the telecommunication facilities required to enact the restoration plan (5). In addition, AVBA had not trained its operating personnel on the implementation of its restoration plan (6) or verified its restoration procedures as required (7).
Finding: WECC found that the EOP-005-1 violations constituted a moderate risk to BPS reliability. With respect to the EOP 005-1 violations, the lack of proper restoration plans could result in a delay in the restoration of AVBA's transmission system and generation. But, SRP, the neighboring TOP, did have a restoration plan in place and would have been able to take the needed actions to restore BPS reliability. In addition, Constellation Energy Control and Dispatch (CECD), in its role as AVBA's BA Service Agent, would have been able to provide support in emergency situations. Also, neither the Reliability Coordinator nor the neighboring TOP had alerted AVBA to any reliability concerns during the course of the violations. The duration of the EOP-005-1 violations was from November 5, 2007 through May 6, 2009. AVBA stipulated to the violations. In approving the settlement agreement, the NERC BOTCC considered the fact that these violations were AVBA's first violations of the relevant Reliability Standards; they were not intentional and were promptly mitigated once discovered; and AVBA was cooperative during the enforcement process and did not conceal the violations. Finally, only one violation constituted a serious or substantial risk to BPS reliability.
Penalty: $60,000 (aggregate for 43 violations)
FERC Order: Issued January 30, 2013 (no further review)
Avista Corporation, FERC Docket No. NP10-26-000 (December 31, 2009)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Not provided
Region: WECC
Issue: Avista's Restoration Plans did not contain the required operating instructions and procedures for synchronizing areas of the system that separated. Duration of violation was from June 18, 2007, when the standard became enforceable, until August 17, 2007.
Finding: Violation was determined not to create a serious or substantial risk to the bulk power system because Avista's operators participated in training twice a year that covered this information.
Penalty: $30,000 (aggregate for multiple violations)
FERC Order: Issued January 29, 2010 (no further review)
Beaches Energy Services of Jacksonville Beach, FERC Docket No. NP11-181-000 (April 29, 2011)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R2, R6
Violation Risk Factor: Medium (R2), High (R6)
Violation Severity Level: Moderate (R2), Severe (R6)
Region: FRCC
Issue: Beaches Energy Services of Jacksonville Beach (BES) had not been maintaining a minimum review cycle for its 2008 system restoration plan. The review was not conducted until March 2009 (R2). In addition, BES did not possess adequate documentation verifying that its operating personnel had received the mandated training concerning the implementation of the restoration plan (R6).
Finding: FRCC and BES entered into a settlement agreement to resolve multiple violations, whereby BES agreed to pay a penalty of $25,000 and to undertake other mitigation measures. FRCC determined that the violation of EOP-005-1 R2 only constituted a minimal risk to bulk power system reliability since BES did possess a valid system restoration plan in 2009 and had conducted training for its personnel. In addition, after reviewing the plan in 2009, no amendments were made. FRCC also found that the violation of EOP-005-1 R6 only constituted a minimal risk to bulk power system reliability since BES affirmed that it had actually conducted training on the implementation of the restoration plan (even though it lacked the proper documentation). The duration of the EOP-005-1 violations was from January 1, 2009 through March 22, 2009 (R2) and from June 18, 2007 through December 6, 2008 (for R6).
Penalty: $25,000 (aggregate for 6 violations)
FERC Order: May 27, 2011 (no further review)
Big Rivers Electric Corporation, FERC Docket No. NP11-253-000 (July 29, 2011)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R2
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Moderate
Region: SERC
Issue: During an on-site audit, SERC found that Big Rivers Electric Corporation (BREC) did not review and update its restoration plan at least annually or when it made changes in the power system network as required by R2. Duration of violation was September 30, 2009 through January 18, 2010.
Finding: SERC determined that the violation posed a minimal risk to the bulk power system because BREC had a system restoration plan and changes to it once it was updated were non-substantive. Moreover, BREC participated in Midwest ISO’s October 2009 restoration drills and found that no changes to the plan were needed. The Administrative Citation Notice also noted the following mitigation activity: BREC started a shared calendar through a company-wide Outlook Exchange Server that permitted employees to view upcoming revision deadlines; BREC also implemented monthly e-mail reminders to pertinent personnel regarding updates to compliance documentation.
Penalty: $2,000
FERC Order: Issued August 29, 2011 (no further review)
Cedar Creek Wind Energy, LLC (CCWE), Docket No. NP12-42 (August 31, 2012)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: 1, 6
Violation Risk Factor: Medium (1), High (6)
Violation Severity Level: Lower (1), High (6)
Region: WECC
Issue: Based on a compliance audit in May 2010, WECC found that CCWE, as a TOP, did not have a complete system restoration plan as CCWE’s restoration plan did not address annual training and participation (element 7 of Attachment-1-EOP-005) (1). CCWE also did not properly train all of its operating personnel to implement its system restoration plan (6).
Finding: WECC found that the EOP-005-1 violations only constituted a minimal risk to BPS reliability. CCWE only owns a 72-mile 230 kV transmission line that connects its wind generation facility to a neighboring entity, and CCWE does not serve any load. As CCWE’s facility is connected to the neighboring entity through a ring bus, any problem on the CCWE line would be isolated and would not impact the continuity of the neighboring entity’s system. The neighboring entity operators also have the authorization to undertake necessary actions on the CCWE line in the event of a partial or total system shutdown, which would mitigate any CCWE failure. The duration of the EOP-005-1 violations was from January 1, 2008 through August 23, 2010 (1) and from January 1, 2008 through September 10, 2010 (6). In approving the settlement agreement, the NERC BOTCC considered the fact that these were CCWE’s first violations of the relevant Reliability Standards; CCWE was cooperative during the enforcement process (complying with all applicable compliance directives) and did not conceal the violations; the violations were not intentional; the violations did not constitute a serious or substantial risk to BPS reliability; and there were no additional aggravating or mitigating factors.
Penalty: $60,000 (aggregate for 10 violations)
FERC Order: Issued September 28, 2012 (no further review)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7
Violation Risk Factor: High with respect to R6 and R7, Medium for the rest
Violation Severity Level: Not provided
Region: ReliabilityFirst Corporation
Issue: Cleveland Public Power (CPP) failed to develop, maintain and implement a restoration plan to reestablish its system in the event of a partial or total shutdown of its system, and therefore did not annually review, periodically test, or coordinate such plans with neighboring generation owners, balancing authorities or transmission operators.
Finding: Duration of violation from June 18, 2007 when the standards became enforceable through September 26, 2008 (March 14, 2008 for R2 violation and November 21, 2008 for R6 violation). In reaching a settlement penalty, ReliabilityFirst considered (1) CPP self-reported the violations; (2) CPP was cooperative throughout the enforcement process; and (3) CPP committed substantial financial and personnel resources, compared to its size, in order to achieve compliance with the standards.
Penalty: $160,000 (aggregate for multiple violations)
FERC Order: Issued January 29, 2010 (no further review)
City of Lansing by its Board of Water and Light (LBWL), FERC Docket No. NP14-31 (February 27, 2014)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: 11/11.5.1/11.5.3
Violation Risk Factor: High
Violation Severity Level: Severe
Region: RFC
Issue: LBWL self-reported that, during an incident on March 29, 2012, it did not ensure that the voltage, frequency and phase angle permitted synchronization. LBWL also did not notify its Reliability Coordinator or receive approval from the Reliability Coordinator before resynchronizing an isolated area. On March 29, 2012, an LBWL test technician inadvertently caused the breaker for a 138 kV line to open, which isolated LBWL’s Eckert substation from the 138 kV substation. When the operator reclosed the breaker at issue, the Eckert substation was not synchronized with the Bulk Electric System (BES), and a severe voltage excursion occurred on the LBWL transmission and distribution system, which caused Eckert Unit 6 to trip offline and a loss of load to approximately 30,000 customers.
Finding: RFC found that the EOP-005-1 violation constituted a moderate risk to BPS reliability. The failure of LBWL’s operator to determine that the Eckert substation was isolated from the BES resulted in the loss of load to 30,000 customers, as well as neighboring TOPs having a 10% voltage decrease for 10 cycles. But, the configuration of LBWL’s system (with generation and load being electrically contiguous, in close proximity and nearly balanced and the two points of service to LBWL being electrically close together) reduces the chance that the islanding of LBWL’s systems would impact the surrounding area of the BPS. In addition, besides the 10% voltage decrease, the March 29, 2012 incident did not cause any instability beyond the LBWL system. The duration of the violation was from March 29, 2012 through May 4, 2012. LBWL admits the violations. In approving the settlement agreement, NERC BOTCC considered the fact that the violations were self-reported and LBWL’s first violations of the relevant Reliability Standards. LBWL has a compliance program in place, which was evaluated as a mitigating factor. LBWL was also cooperative during the enforcement process and did not conceal the violations. In addition, none of the violations constituted a serious or substantial risk to BPS reliability.
Total Penalty: $30,000 (aggregate for 2 violations)
FERC Order: Issued March 28, 2014 (no further review)
Eugene Water & Electric Board (EWEB), Docket No. NP12-22-000 (March 30, 2012)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7
Violation Risk Factor: Medium (R1, R3, R4, R5); High (R6, R7)
Violation Severity Level: Severe (all)
Region: WECC
Issue: EWEB registered as a TOP with NERC effective as of May 8, 2009, and subsequently, EWEB submitted self-reports addressing non-compliance with NERC Reliability Standards. EWEB is located in the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) Control Area. Prior to May 8, BPA was registered with NERC as the area TOP, and BPA had informed EWEB that it was not required to register as a TOP with NERC; however, after review of a FERC order discussing TOP compliance, on April 6, 2009, BPA notified EWEB that it would no longer serve as its TOP. EWEB then registered as a TOP and reported itself as non-compliant with applicable NERC Reliability Standards.
Starting on May 8, 2009, the date EWEB registered as a TOP with NERC, EWEB was in violation of R1, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7 of EOP-005-1. EWEB was in violation of EOP-005-1 R1 as it had no restoration plan in place for restarting its electrical system in a way that would ensure a stable and orderly reconnect during any partial or total system shutdown. EWEB also did not have the required operating instructions and procedures to cover emergency conditions and the loss of critical telecommunications channels. Regarding R3, EWEB had not created restoration plans outlining the priority of restoration of the interconnection. Regarding R4, EWEB had not coordinated restoration plans with GOs and BAs in its area nor its RC and neighboring TOPs and BAs. Regarding R5, EWEB was not testing its telecommunications facilities required for its restoration plan on a periodic basis, as required. Regarding R6, EWEB did not train its operating personnel on the mechanics of the restoration plan, in violation of EOP-005-1 R6. Lastly, regarding R7, EWEB did not verify its restoration plan through actual or simulated testing.
Finding: The violations posed no serious or substantial risk to BPS reliability. WECC considered that EWEB was new to the TOP role because of a registration issue. Although EWEB did not have a restoration plan in place meeting the EOP-005-1 requirements, BPS risk was mitigated because BPA, acting as EWEB’s TOP, had a restoration plan in place for use by EWEB, and EWEB and BPA have an Emergency Assistance Agreement which EWEB could have called upon in the event of a system emergency. In addition, BPA conducted a technical assessment of EWEB’s electrical system in determining whether it would act as EWEB’s TOP, and the assessment results showed that BPA was not performing TOP duties in the first place, and second it did not need control of the EWEB system for BPS reliability. As the BA for EWEB, BPA was responsible for system reliability within its footprint. While EWEB was working towards TOP certification, BPA performed TOP duties such as coordinating outage plans, day-to-day routine real-time communications and notifications and any unplanned work forced by equipment failures, storms, etc. BPA assured the RC it would continue to communicate any planned and emergency outages and would work diligently with EWEB to obtain full TOP certification. At the time EWEB registered as a TOP, it was working on compliance with its other functions as Transmission Owner (TO), Transmission Provider (TP), Purchasing-Selling Entity (PSE), Load Serving Entity (LSE), Distribution Provider (DP), Generator Owner (GO) and Generator Operator (GOP).
WECC assessed no penalty due to the circumstances surrounding the non compliance. BPA unexpectedly notified EWEB that it would not be its TOP, effective immediately on April 6, 2009. EWEB then found itself immediately required to be NERC compliant. EWEB submitted its self reports in a timely manner and in addition submitted mitigation plans which were timely completed. The violations were not repeat violations and were not contested by EWEB.
Penalty: $0
FERC Order: Issued April 30, 2012 (no further review)
Hetch Hetchy Water and Power (HHWP), Docket No. NP12-47-000 (September 28, 2012)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: 6, 7
Violation Risk Factor: High
Violation Severity Level: Severe
Region: WECC
Issue: HHWP self-reported in July 2011 that it had not complied with the requirement of EOP-005-1 R6 in that, as a TOP, it failed to train system operators after it completed an upgrade to its system restoration plan. HHWP also self-reported that it did not perform the required verification of its system restoration plan by testing or simulation in violation of EOP-005-1 R7.
Finding: The violations were deemed to pose minimal risk to BPS reliability because the system restoration plan had been developed with the assistance of HHWP's NERC-certified operating personnel, and the plan was made up of routine switching orders regularly performed by those operators. WECC noted that HHWP has no blackstart capability and is not required to develop a cranking path for any other BPS entity. In determining the appropriate penalty, WECC gave no credit for the self-reports; however, HHWP's internal compliance program was a mitigating factor. HHWP agreed/stipulated to WECC's finding.
Penalty: $50,000 (aggregate for six violations)
FERC Order: Issued October 26, 2012 (no further review)
Lee County Electric Cooperative, Inc., FERC Docket No. NP11-266-000 (August 31, 2011)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1, R6
Violation Risk Factor: Medium (R1), High (R6)
Violation Severity Level: Lower (R1), Severe (R6)
Region: FRCC
Issue: During an audit, FRCC determined that Lee County Electric Cooperative, Inc.'s (LCEC) system restoration plan did not contain certain elements required by R1 of the standard for (1) procedures for simulating and, where practical, actually testing the plans resources and (2) retaining personnel training records reflecting that operating personnel have been trained annually in the implementation of the plan and have taken part in restoration exercises. FRCC also determined that LCEC had not trained its operating personnel in the implementation of its restoration plan for 2008 or 2009 in violation of R6.
Finding: FRCC found that the violations did not constitute a serious or substantial risk to the bulk power system because LCEC personnel often participated in FRCC's annual system operator training workshops and drills with LCEC's Balancing Authority. Duration of violation was from June 18, 2007 through March 15, 2010 (R1) and January 1, 2008 through March 12, 2010 (R6).
Penalty: $30,000 (aggregate for 7 violations)
FERC Order: Issued September 30, 2011 (no further review)
Mesquite Power LLC, FERC Docket No. NP12-35 (June 29, 2012)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1, R4, R5
Violation Risk Factor: Medium (R1, R4, R5)
Violation Severity Level: High (R4, R5), Severe (R1)
Region: WECC
Issue: In March 2009, Mesquite Power LLC (Mesquite), as a TOP, self-certified that it did not have a restoration plan in place to reestablish its electric system in a stable and orderly manner after a partial or total shutdown of its system, including providing the necessary operating instructions and procedures to cover emergency conditions and the loss of vital telecommunications channels (R1). As Mesquite did not have the required restoration plan, it was unable to coordinate its restoration plans for interconnected transmission facilities with the GOs and BAs within its area, its RC, or its neighboring TOPs and BAs (R4). Mesquite was therefore also unable to periodically test the telecommunication facilities needed to implement its restoration plans for interconnected transmission facilities (R5).
Finding: WECC found that the EOP-005-1 violations only constituted a minimal risk to BPS reliability since Mesquite was coordinating all of its activities pursuant to the direction of its BA (including the activities with Mesquite’s RC). The duration of the EOP-005-1 violations was from November 5, 2007 through May 27, 2009. In approving the settlement agreement, the NERC BOTCC considered the fact that these were Mesquite’s first violations of the relevant Reliability Standard; one of the violations (VAR-002-1 R3) was self-reported; Mesquite was cooperative during the enforcement process and did not conceal the violations; Mesquite did have a compliance program in place (which was evaluated as a mitigating factor); there were two violations of the same Reliability Standard (PER-003-0 R1) that demonstrated the repeat nature of the violation (which was evaluated as an aggravating factor); the violations did not constitute a serious or substantial risk to BPS reliability; and there were no additional aggravating or mitigating factors.
Penalty: $60,000 (aggregate for 26 violations)
FERC Order: Order issued July 27, 2012 (no further review)
Milford Wind Corridor Phase I, LLC, FERC Docket No. NP13-40 (June 27, 2013)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: 1, 2, 5, 6, 7
Violation Risk Factor: Medium (1, 2, 5), High (6, 7)
Violation Severity Level: Severe (1, 2, 5, 6, 7)
Region: WECC
Issue: Milford Wind Corridor Phase I, LLC (Milford Wind) self-certified that it did not develop a sufficient restoration plan that would, in the event of a partial or total shutdown of its transmission system, reestablish its transmission system in a stable and orderly manner (1). As a result, Milford Wind also had not: (a) performed an annual review and update of its restoration plan (2), (b) conducted periodic testing of its telecommunication facilities that would be required to implement the restoration plan (5), (c) trained its personnel to implement the restoration plan (6), and (d) verified the restoration plan through actual testing or simulation (7).
Finding: WECC found that the EOP-005-1 violations only constituted a minimal risk to BPS reliability since Milford Wind did have a restoration plan in place (even though it did not include all of the required elements). Milford Wind’s output is not baseload generation, and if Milford Wind was unable to deliver its generation, the host BA would be able to find replacement generation without there being an adverse impact on BPS reliability. Milford Wind’s generation is non-firm and intermittent, and thus its transmission facilities are limited in use. Milford Wind’s transmission line is radial in nature and is only used to connect Milford Wind’s generation to the bulk power system. The EOP-005-1 R1, 2, 5 and 7 violations occurred from May 18, 2010 through September 17, 2012, and the EOP-005-1 R6 violation from May 18, 2010 through October 19, 2012. Milford neither admitted nor denied the violations. In approving the settlement agreement, NERC BOTCC considered the fact that these violations were Milford Wind’s first violations of the relevant Reliability Standard and that Milford Wind had a compliance program in place. Milford Wind was also cooperative during the enforcement process and did not conceal the violations.
Total Penalty: $81,000 (aggregate for 15 violations)
FERC Order: Issued July 26, 2013 (no further review)
Modesto Irrigation District, FERC Docket No. NP10-93-000 (March 31, 2010)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Not discussed
Region: WECC
Issue: Modesto Irrigation District's (MID) Restoration Plan did not contain procedures for the loss of vital telecommunication channels.
Finding: The alleged violation occurred from June 18, 2007, when the Standard became enforceable, until September 24, 2008, when MID completed a mitigation plan. Through settlement, no penalty was assessed and MID agreed to undertake a number of activities, including accelerating "Job Task Analysis" development for MID's operators and construction of a back-up control center. In reaching the agreement, WECC considered that it was MID’s first violations of this Standard; the violations did not pose a serious or substantial risk to the reliability of the bulk power system; MID is a government entity and a small irrigation district; most violations were self-reported; MID did not attempt to conceal the violations; and the violations were not intentional.
Penalty: $0
FERC Order: Issued April 30, 2010 (no further review)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7
Violation Risk Factor: Medium (R1, R2, R3, R4, R5); High (R6, R7)
Violation Severity Level: Not provided
Region: WECC
Issue: In January 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration-Los Alamos National Laboratory (NNSAL) self-reported that it did not have a restoration plan: (R1) that would be able to reestablish its electric system in a stable and orderly manner in cases where there is a partial or total shutdown of its system; (R2) that was reviewed and updated at least annually and would incorporate changes in the power system network and address problems found during simulated restoration exercises; (R3) that had restoring the integrity of the Interconnection as a priority; (R4) that was coordinated with the Generator Owners and Balancing Authorities within its area, its Reliability Coordinator, and neighboring Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities; and (R7) that was verified by actual testing or simulation. In addition, NNSAL self-reported that it had not periodically tested its telecommunication facilities that are required to implement the restoration plan or trained its operating personnel on how to implement the restoration plan, as required by R5 and R6, respectively.
Finding: WECC found that the violations did not pose a serious or substantial risk to the bulk power system since NNSAL did actually have a restoration plan in place (even though it did not meet all of the specific requirements of EOP-005-1). In addition, in terms of R4, NNSAL did engage in regular communications with the Generator Owners and Balancing Authorities within its area, its Reliability Coordinator, and neighboring Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities. NNSAL was also testing its relevant telecommunication facilities (R5) and had a training program, which covered restoration activities, for its personnel (R6/R7). These violations were self-reported and were NNSAL's first violations of this Reliability Standard. A mitigation plan has been completed.
Penalty: $0
FERC Order: Issued November 13, 2009 (no further review)
Public Service Company of Colorado, FERC Docket No. NP10-2-000 (October 14, 2009)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1, R2, R5, R7
Violation Risk Factor: Medium (R1, R2, R5); High (R7)
Violation Severity Level: Not provided
Region: WECC
Issue: In August and September 2007, Public Service Company of Colorado (PSCC) self-reported that the documentation for its system restoration plans did not fully meet the requirements of EOP-005-1. For example, the restoration plan was not updated, as required, when a new substation was added to a primary black start line in 2007. In addition, PSCC self-reported that it had not properly documented the testing of its telecommunication facilities that are need to implement the restoration plan or the procedures used in its restoration plan training for its relevant personnel.
Finding: WECC found that the violations did not pose a serious or substantial risk to the bulk power system since PSCC did actually have system restoration procedures, some informal, in place (even though they did not meet all of the specific requirements of EOP-005-1). These procedures have already been used during outage events on PSCC's system. In addition, the necessary testing and training was being performed (even though it was not documented). The violations were primarily documentation issues. The violations were self-reported and were PSCC's first violations of this Reliability Standard. Mitigation plans have been completed.
Penalty: $0
FERC Order: Issued November 13, 2009 (no further review)
Public Utility District No. 1 of Chelan County, FERC Docket NP10-116-000 (June 2, 2010)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R2, R6, R7
Violation Risk Factor: Medium for R2 and High for R6 and R7
Violation Severity Level: Not provided
Region: WECC
Issue: An audit team determined that Public Utility District No. 1 of Chelan County ("Chelan") did not annually review and update its Emergency Restoration Plan, and only trained half of its operators in 2006 and even fewer in 2007. Also, Chelan did not provide evidence of verification of its restoration procedure by actual testing or simulation as required by the standard.
Finding: Duration of the violations from June 18, 2007 when the standards became enforceable through April 17, 2008. The violations did not pose a serious or substantial risk to the bulk power system because while the violations could delay restoration of the system after an event, the configuration of the system around Chelan and the fact that its system supplies mainly its own load minimized the effect of the delay. This was Chelan's first violation of these standards.
Penalty: $35,000 (aggregate for multiple violations)
FERC Order: Issued July 2, 2010 (no further review)
Public Utility District No. 1 of Clark County, FERC Docket No. NP12-5 (November 30, 2011)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Severe
Region: WECC
Issue: In preparation for its registration with NERC as a TOP, in April 2009 CKPD self-reported non-compliance with EOP-005-1 R1, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7. CKPD explained that its TOP, Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), informed it on April 6, 2009, that it would no longer function as CKPD’s TOP effective immediately. As a result, CKPD was required to register as a TOP and report non-compliance with the Standard. CKPD reported that the requirements of EOP-005-1 were new to CKPD because of its TOP registration, and at the time of registration the following issues had not been resolved causing violations of the Standard. R1: CKPD did not have a restoration plan setting forth procedures for reconnection of the electric system after a partial or total shutdown or procedures in the event of emergency conditions and a complete loss of vital telecommunications channels. R3: CKPD did not have restoration plans setting the restoration of Interconnection integrity as a priority. R4: CKPD had not coordinated its restoration plans with the GOs and BAs in its area or adjacent TOPs and BAs. R5: CKPD had not tested its restoration plan on telecommunication facilities that would be needed in the event the restoration plan had to be used. R6: Operators at CKPD were not trained on implementation of the restoration plan. R7: CKPD’s restoration plan was not verified through actual testing or simulation.
Finding: WECC determined the violations did not pose a serious or substantial risk to the reliability of the BPS because all of the violations were related to CKPD not having system restoration plans and procedures in place; however, the restoration plans available through BPA were available to CKPD during the small time period it was developing its own system restoration plans and procedures. In addition, at the time of its registration for the TOP function, CKPD was satisfying the requirements for its other functions as a TO, PSE, LSE, DP, GO and GOP. BPA performed tests on CKPD’s electric system during April 2009 which showed that it was not conducting TOP duties at the facility and the facility was not required to maintain system reliability. BPA also reported that CPKD employs experienced operators and also has internal maintenance procedures including a 24-hour dispatch center. WECC assessed no penalty for the violations based on the extenuating circumstances surrounding the non-compliance. In particular, BPA’s notice to CKPD that it would no longer operate as the TOP was unexpected and effective immediately. Consequently, CKPD was immediately responsible for registration and compliance with all applicable TOP standards. WECC also considered the following mitigating factors: the violations were self-reported, mitigation plans were quickly submitted and timely completed; the risk to the BPS was not serious or substantial; the violations were not repeat violations; and CKPD did not dispute the violations.
Penalty: $0 (for 33 violations)
FERC Order: Issued December 30, 2011 (no further review)
Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County (SNPD), Docket No. NP12-22-000 (March 30, 2012)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7
Violation Risk Factor: Medium (R1, R3, R4, R5); High (R6, R7)
Violation Severity Level: Severe (R1, R3, R4, R6, R7); High (R5)
Region: WECC
Issue: SNPD registered as a TOP with NERC effective as of February 6, 2009, and subsequently, SNPD submitted self-reports addressing non-compliance with NERC Reliability Standards. SNPD is located in the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) Control Area. BPA was registered with NERC as the area TOP, and BPA had informed SNPD that it was not required to register as a TOP with NERC; however, after review of a FERC order discussing TOP compliance, on December 24, 2008, BPA notified SNPD that it would no longer serve as its TOP, effective immediately. SNPD then registered as a TOP and reported itself as non-compliant with applicable NERC Reliability Standards. SNPD underwent a WECC audit in January 2012 and no compliance violations were found.
Starting on February 6, 2009, the date SPND registered as a TOP with NERC, SNPD was in violation of EOP-005-1 R1, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7. Regarding R1, SNPD did not have a restoration plan in place to reestablish its electric system during a partial or total shutdown, including instruction and procedures for dealing with emergency conditions and the loss of critical telecommunications channels. Regarding R3, SNPD had no restoration plans in place indicating the priority of protecting the Interconnection during any SNPD system problems. Regarding R4, SNPD did not coordinate restoration plans with neighboring GOs and BAs or its RC and adjacent TOPs and BAs. Regarding R5, SNPD was not periodically testing its telecommunications facilities required by the restoration plan. Regarding R6, SNPD did not train relevant employees on the implementation of the restoration plan. Finally, regarding R7, SNPD had not confirmed the restoration procedures via actual or simulated testing.
Finding: The violations posed no serious or substantial risk to BPS reliability. WECC considered that SNPD was new to the TOP role because of a registration issue. Even though SPND did not have formal plans in place for operating emergencies, and as such was not reviewing, testing or conducting training on the required plans at least yearly or coordinating the relevant plans with adjacent TOPs and BAs as required, the risk was mitigated because all of the EOP-001-0 requirements were contained in various agreements with the BPA. The plans were developed by BPA and were acceptable procedures for mitigating operating emergencies during the time SNPD was restating the agreements’ terms and adding them into its own emergency plan. In addition, BPA conducted a technical assessment of SPND’s electrical system in determining whether it would act as SPND’s TOP, and the assessment results showed that BPA was not performing TOP duties in the first place, and second it did not need control of the SNPD system for BPS reliability. While SNPD was working towards TOP certification, BPA performed TOP duties such as coordinating outage plans, day-to-day routine real-time communications and notifications and any unplanned work forced by equipment failures, storms, etc. BPA assured the RC it would continue to communicate any planned and emergency outages and would work diligently with SNPD to obtain full TOP certification. At the time SNPD registered as a TOP, it was working on compliance with its other functions as Transmission Owner (TO), Transmission Provider (TP), Purchasing-Selling Entity (PSE), Load Serving Entity (LSE), Distribution Provider (DP), Generator Owner (GO) and Generator Operator (GOP).
WECC assessed no penalty due to the circumstances surrounding the non compliance. BPA unexpectedly notified SNPD that it would not be its TOP, effective immediately on December 24, 2008. SNPD then found itself immediately required to be NERC compliant. SNPD submitted its self reports in a timely manner and in addition submitted mitigation plans which were timely completed. The violations were not repeat violations and were not contested by SNPD.
Penalty: $0
FERC Order: Issued April 30, 2012 (no further review)
Silicon Valley Power (SVP), FERC Docket No. NP13-21-000 (January 31, 2013)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Violation Risk Factor: Medium (all)
Violation Severity Level: Severe (all)
Region: WECC
Issue: SVP, as a TOP, self-certified that it did not have a restoration plan to reestablish its electric system in a stable and orderly manner, such as detailing necessary operating instructions and procedures to cover emergency conditions and the loss of vital telecommunication channels, in response to a partial or total shutdown of its system (1). As SVP did not have the required restoration plan, it had not been annually reviewing and updating its restoration plan as required (2) and did not list the restoration of the integrity of the interconnection as a priority in its restoration plan (3). SVP was also unable to coordinate its restoration plan with the GOs, TOs, BA or RC within its area (4) or to test its telecommunication facilities needed to implement the restoration plan (5). Also, SVP did not provide its operating personnel with training on the implementation of the restoration plan (6) and could not verify the restoration procedures through testing or simulation (7).
Finding: WECC found that the EOP-005-1 R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7 violations constituted only a minimal risk to BPS reliability. The Metered Subsystem Agreement, which SVP and CAISO are parties to, contains procedures for load restoration in situations where SVP’s customers are impacted by reliability problems in CAISO, reducing the risk to customers of a partial or total shutdown of the SVP system. Even though the Metered Subsystem Agreement does not specify telecommunication facility testing procedures, SVP uses the same telecommunication facilities for its day-to-day operations and for restoration procedures. In addition to the Metered Subsystem Agreement, SVP’s Interconnection Agreement with Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) addresses coordinating restoration with CAISO and PG&E. Also, four (out of six) of SVP’s transmission operators were NERC-certified at the time of the violations. The duration of the EOP-005-1 violations was from May 27, 2011 through September 12, 2012 (6) and September 21, 2012 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7). SVP agreed and stipulated to the violations. In approving the settlement agreement, the NERC BOTCC considered the fact that these were the SVP’s first violations of the relevant Reliability Standards and four of the violations were self-reported. URE was also cooperative during the enforcement process, did not conceal the violations and engaged in voluntary corrective action to remediate the violations. Twelve of the violations posed a minimal risk to BPS reliability, and five of the violations posed a moderate risk, while none of the violations posed a serious or substantial risk to BPS reliability.
Total Penalty: $150,000 (aggregate for 17 violations)
FERC Order: Issued March 1, 2013 (no further review)
Southwestern Public Service Co., FERC Docket No. NP08-9-000 (June 4, 2008)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Not provided
Region: SPP
Issue: SPS self-reported that several of the required operating procedures were in place but not sufficiently documented in a consolidated location.
Finding: No penalty assessed because the violations were self-reported and quickly remedied, occurred prior to the standards becoming mandatory, and the violations were deemed not to put bulk power system reliability at serious or substantial risk.
Penalty: $0
FERC Order: 124 FERC ¶ 61,015 (2008); http://www.nerc.com/files/NoticeOfPenaltyOrder.pdf
Sunflower Electric Power Corporation, FERC Docket No. NP11-228-000 (June 30, 2011)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Lower
Region: SPP
Issue: In January 2010, Sunflower Electric Power Corporation (Sunflower) self-reported that its restoration plan did not address the fuel resources for its blackstart units as required.
Finding: SPP found that the violation constituted only a minimal risk to bulk power system reliability since Sunflower was actually routinely monitoring its diesel fuel tanks in order to verify that its blackstart units would have adequate fuel. The duration of the violation was from June 18, 2007 through February 25, 2011.
Penalty: $0 (aggregate for 2 violations)
FERC Order: Issued July 29, 2011 (no further review)
TransAlta Centralia Generation, LLC, FERC Docket No. NP10-2-000 (October 14, 2009)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R9, R11
Violation Risk Factor: Medium (R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R9); High (R6, R7, R11)
Violation Severity Level: Not provided
Region: WECC
Issue: In May 2008, TransAlta Centralia Generation, LLC (TransAlta) self-reported that the System Restoration Plans for its transmission facilities did not meet all the requirements of EOP-005-1.
Finding: WECC found that the violations did not pose a serious or substantial risk to the bulk power system since TransAlta did actually have System Restoration Plans in place (even though they did not meet all of the specific requirements of EOP-005-1). The violations were self-reported and they were TransAlta's first violations of this Reliability Standard. A mitigation plan has been completed.
Penalty: $0
FERC Order: Issued November 13, 2009 (no further review)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1, R4
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Not provided
Region: WECC
Issue: Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc.’s (TSGT) restoration plan did not include the loss of vital telecommunications channels at TSGT’s primary and backup control centers and at remote vital system facilities and TSGT failed to provide evidence to show that it had coordinated its restoration plan with the Generator Owners in its footprint.
Finding: The alleged violations occurred from July 11, 2007, when TSGT was placed on the NERC registry as a Transmission Operator, through September 8, 2009, when TSGT completed its Mitigation Plan. WECC imposed a $26,000 penalty for these and other alleged violation. In assessing the penalty, WECC considered these factors: this was TSGT’s first instance of non-compliance with these standards; TSGT cooperated during the compliance enforcement process; TSGT did not attempt to conceal a violation or intend to do so; and WECC found that the alleged violations did not create a serious or substantial risk to the bulk power system.
Penalty: $26,000 (aggregate for multiple violations)
FERC Order: Issued July 2, 2010 (no further review)
Unidentified Registered Entity, FERC Docket No. NP11-116-000 (February 23, 2011)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R4
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Lower
Region: FRCC
Issue: As a result of a compliance audit, FRCC found that a Registered Entity did not possess adequate documentation showing that the Registered Entity had coordinated its restoration plans with other Generators Owners within its area, as required.
Finding: FRCC and the Registered Entity entered into a settlement agreement to resolve multiple violations, whereby the Registered Entity agreed to pay a penalty of $75,000 and to undertake other mitigation measures to resolve multiple violations. FRCC found that the EOP-005-1 violation did not constitute a serious or substantial risk to bulk power system reliability since the Registered Entity had already adopted a System Restoration Plan, which it had coordinated both with generation facilities within its corporate organization and with generation facilities within its Balancing Authorities, its neighboring Transmission Operators and its Reliability Coordinator. In addition, the Registered Entity had developed operating and interconnection agreements with certain independent power producer generators. The duration of the EOP-005-1 violation was from June 18, 2007 through December 17, 2008. In approving the settlement agreement, NERC considered the fact that these were the Registered Entity's first violations of the relevant Reliability Standards; the Registered Entity self-reported some of the violations; the Registered Entity was cooperative during the enforcement process and did not conceal the violations; there was a compliance program in place; and there were no additional mitigating or aggravating factors.
Penalty: $75,000 (aggregate for multiple violations)
FERC Order: Issued March 25, 2011 (no further review)
Unidentified Registered Entity, FERC Docket No. NP11-128-000 (February 23, 2011)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1, R2, R3, R4
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Not provided
Region: WECC
Issue: Following a compliance audit, WECC Enforcement determined Unidentified Registered Entity (URE) had a violation of the following
Requirements: 1) R1, because URE’s restoration plan was deficient. Among other things, it did not include all of the required elements, such as documentation indicating which functions were to be coordinated with and among Reliability Coordinators and neighboring Transmission Operators, incorrectly mentioned coordinating restoration switching with other Control Areas instead of the Balancing Authority, and did not reference recent or proper training of personnel on the restoration plan; 2) R2, because URE failed to provide evidence that it reviewed and updated its restoration plan on an annual basis and whenever changes were made to its power system network, and it could not show evidence that it corrected deficiencies identified during testing of the plan; 3) R3, because URE’s restoration plan did not indicate that it had a priority of restoring the integrity of the Interconnection; and 4) R4, because there was no evidence indicating URE coordinated its restoration plans with neighboring Transmission Operators.
Finding: WECC Enforcement determined that the violations of R1 and R4 posed a moderate risk to the bulk power system because URE has interconnections to larger entities, so it is critical that URE have a restoration plan that includes proper coordination. WECC Enforcement determined that the violations of R2 and R3 did not pose a serious or substantial risk to the bulk power system because URE was a small entity that did have a restoration plan, and URE operating personnel would make Interconnection a priority in the event of an emergency because the system could not be fully energized from within. In determining the penalty amount, the NERC Board of Trustees Compliance Committee considered the following factors: this was URE’s first occurrence of this type of violation; URE was cooperative; and the number and nature of the violations.
Penalty: $450,000 (aggregated for multiple violations)
FERC Order: Issued March 25, 2011 (no further review)
Unidentified Registered Entity, FERC Docket No. NP11-137-000 (March 30, 2011)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R7
Violation Risk Factor: High
Violation Severity Level: Moderate
Region: WECC
Issue: URE self-reported a pre-June 18, 2007 violation in that it found it had not verified its restoration procedure by actual testing or by simulation as required by the Standard. URE submitted a Mitigation Plan with a proposed completion date of January 15, 2008, but on May 19, 2008 it requested an extension of the completion date. Because URE failed to seek an extension prior to the initial proposed completion date, the violation became a an enforceable violation. Duration of violation was June 18, 2007, when the Standard became enforceable, through July 22, 2008, when the violations were mitigated.
Finding: WECC Enforcement determined that the violation did not pose a serious or substantial risk to the bulk power system because the URE had tested portions of the restoration procedure, though not all of it. Further, the NERC BOTCC concluded the penalty appropriate because this was URE’s first violation of most of the Standards involved, URE self-reported 28 of 30 violations, and URE was cooperative during the investigation.
Penalty: $106,000 (aggregate for 30 violations)
FERC Order: Issued April 29, 2011 (no further review)
Unidentified Registered Entity, FERC Docket No. NP11-218-000 (June 29, 2011)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R2, R4
Violation Risk Factor: Medium (R2, R4)
Violation Severity Level: Moderate (R2), Lower (R4)
Region: WECC
Issue: WECC found that the Registered Entity had not timely performed the required annual review of its restoration plan for its Black Start procedure (R2). In addition, the Registered Entity did not have provisions in its Black Start procedure addressing coordination with Generator Owners as required (R4).
Finding: WECC and the Registered Entity entered into a settlement agreement to resolve multiple violations, whereby the Registered Entity agreed to pay a penalty of $130,000 and to undertake other mitigation measures. WECC found that the EOP-005-1 R2 violation constituted only a minimal risk to bulk power system reliability, but the EOP-005-1 R4 violation posed a moderate risk. In regards to R2, the review was conducted 14 months after the previous review, and this delay was unlikely to have an impact on the effectiveness of the restoration plan. In regards to R4, the Registered Entity’s restoration plan addressed coordination with Balancing Authorities, Transmission Operators and the Reliability Coordinator (just not coordination with the Generator Owners). The duration of the EOP-005-1 violations was from October 5, 2008 through January 15, 2009 (R2) and from June 18, 2007 through November 16, 2009 (R4). In approving the settlement agreement, NERC found that there were three instances of noncompliance with Regional Reliability Standard PRC-STD-005-1 WR1 (which was evaluated as an aggravating factor); some of the violations were self-reported; the Registered Entity was cooperative during the enforcement process and did not conceal the violations; the Registered Entity had a compliance program in place (which was evaluated as a mitigating factor); the penalties for the violations of Reliability Standards EOP-001-0 R6 and EOP-005-1 R2 were aggregated since both penalties were based on a single act of noncompliance; the penalties for the violations of Reliability Standards PRC-STD-005-1 WR1 and VAR-STD-002b-1 WR1 were based on the respective Sanction Tables; and there were no additional aggravating or mitigating factors.
Penalty: $130,000 (aggregate for 27 violations)
FERC Order: Issued July 29, 2011 (no further review)
Unidentified Registered Entity, FERC Docket No. NP12-2 (October 31, 2011)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Lower
Region: WECC
Issue: URE self-reported that, in 2008, four of its power dispatchers had not timely received the required annual training on the implementation of URE’s system restoration plans.
Finding: WECC found that the violation constituted a minimal risk to BPS reliability since the four relevant employees had previously received the relevant training and the 2008 training requirement for those employees was eventually conducted (between 43 and 112 days after the deadline). In addition, copies of the system restoration plan were made available to all of URE’s operators. This was URE’s first violation of the relevant Reliability Standard. WECC evaluated URE’s compliance program as a mitigating factor.
Penalty: $37,000 (aggregate for 4 violations)
FERC Order: Issued November 30, 2011 (no further review).
Unidentified Registered Entity (URE), Docket No. NP12-47-000 (September 28, 2012)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: 1
Violation Risk Factor: Medium
Violation Severity Level: Lower
Region: WECC
Issue: URE was found to be in violation of EOP-005-1 R1 as a result of its restoration plan not containing necessary operating instructions and procedures to cover the loss of vital telecommunications channels as required by the Standard.
Finding: The violation was deemed to pose moderate risk to BPS reliability because URE had a plan in place to connect directly with another entity to cover emergency conditions. Also, URE's system operators could show during Audit interviews that they are trained to man critical facilities when necessary. In determining the appropriate penalty, URE was given mitigating credit for its internal compliance program; however, URE's violation history was considered an aggravating factor.
Penalty: $65,000 (for 11 violations)
FERC Order: Issued October 26, 2012 (no further review)
Utilities Commission of New Smyrna Beach, FERC Docket No. NP10-2-000 (October 14, 2009)
Reliability Standard: EOP-005-1
Requirement: R1, R7
Violation Risk Factor: Medium for R1 and High for R7
Violation Severity Level: Not provided
Region: FRCC
Issue: Utilities Commission of New Smyrna Beach's ("New Smyrna") procedures did not address the loss of vital data telecommunications channels, and it could not document the testing or simulation of its system restoration procedures as required by the standard. Duration of the violation was from June 18, 2007 when the standard became enforceable through October 17, 2008 with respect to R1 and March 10, 2009 with respect to R7.
Finding: Penalty was deemed appropriate because this was New Smyrna's first violation of this standard, and did not pose a serious or substantial threat to the reliability of the bulk power system.
Penalty: $0
FERC Order: Issued November 13, 2009 (no further review)
