China enacts anti-cross-border corruption law: Key implications for multinationals
18 min read
On November 6, 2026, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted the PRC1 Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law (the "Law"). The Law took effect immediately upon promulgation under Presidential Order No. 89. It establishes China's first dedicated statutory framework for addressing cross-border corruption, and introduces compliance, reporting, investigative, and cross-border cooperation considerations that may affect how multinational companies respond to corruption issues involving China. With no general transition period, companies with operations, personnel, counterparties, or data connected to China should promptly assess the Law's implications for existing compliance and governance arrangements.
Key takeaways
- China has established its first dedicated statutory framework addressing cross-border corruption. The Law covers public-sector bribery, specified duty-related misconduct, overseas flight, and corruption-related asset transfers. Rather than creating a comprehensive new set of corruption offences, it operates alongside existing criminal, supervisory, administrative, and commercial anti-corruption regimes.
- The Law strengthens China's cross-border enforcement architecture. New coordination mechanisms, international-cooperation provisions, reciprocity-based measures, and countermeasures against specified foreign actions point to a more coordinated and institutionalized approach to cross-border anti-corruption enforcement.
- Covered enterprises need demonstrable compliance systems. The requirements expressly extend to China-based branches and subsidiaries of overseas enterprises, and include risk assessment, internal reporting mechanisms, financial controls, third-party oversight, integrity training, investigation procedures and related controls. Existing global compliance programs should be tested against these China-specific requirements.
- Compliance failures may carry consequences even in the absence of proven corruption. The Law provides for correction orders and, where an enterprise refuses to rectify identified deficiencies, potential regulatory consequences, including suspension of relevant business activities or revocation of permits.
- Reporting assessments should begin early. Covered enterprises discovering suspected cross-border corruption are required to report in accordance with the law, although the reporting trigger, timing, threshold, and procedures remain unclear. Reporting, cooperation, and remediation may mitigate enforcement risk, but should not be assumed to guarantee leniency or immunity.
- Internal investigations and overseas disclosures require separate assessments. The Law requires enterprises to investigate suspected violations while restricting certain foreign enforcement activities and the provision of evidence, data, and related assistance overseas without appropriate authorization. The fact that an investigation is conducted internally does not, by itself, mean that subsequent disclosure to overseas regulators or authorities is permissible without appropriate authorization.
Scope of application
Five categories of cross-border corruption
The Law identifies five categories of cross-border corruption activities to which that framework applies. It does not create new criminal offenses. Liability for underlying conduct continues to depend on the specific elements and jurisdictional reach of applicable laws, including the PRC Criminal Law and, where relevant, the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.2 Whether, and to what extent, purely private-sector bribery or embezzlement falls within Article 2(3)'s duty-related misconduct provisions or Article 2(4)'s comparable-corruption provisions remains unclear.3 The five categories are:
- Bribery of foreign public officials. Bribery of foreign public officials or officials of international public organizations by Chinese citizens, enterprises or other organizations, including their branches and subsidiaries; or by overseas persons, enterprises or other organizations, including their branches, where the bribery occurs in China.4
- Bribery of Chinese public officials and public bodies. Overseas persons, enterprises or other organizations, including their branches, bribing Chinese public officials, specified connected persons, state organs, state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"), public institutions, or people's organizations, together with the related acceptance of bribes.5
- Other overseas duty-related misconduct. Chinese citizens, enterprises or other organizations, including their branches and subsidiaries, committing specified duty-related violations or crimes overseas outside the first two categories. These include embezzlement and bribery, abuse of power, dereliction of duty, rent-seeking, improper transfers of benefits, favoritism or malpractice, and waste of state assets.6
- Comparable overseas corruption with results in China. Other corruption of a similar nature to the first three categories, where all or part of the conduct occurs overseas and all or part of the results occur in China.7 The Law does not define what constitutes a result occurring in China. The circumstances in which overseas conduct may be regarded as producing domestic effects are likely to depend on future judicial interpretations and enforcement practice.
- Overseas flight and cross-border asset transfers. Suspected corrupt persons fleeing or hiding overseas, and the cross-border transfer of corruption-related assets.8
Corporate compliance: Coverage and requirements
Covered enterprises. The compliance chapter applies directly to: (i) PRC enterprises with overseas branches, subsidiaries or investment activities; and (ii) overseas enterprises' PRC branches and subsidiaries. PRC enterprises are required to extend specified oversight and controls to their overseas branches and subsidiaries, as outlined below.9
Compliance requirements. Covered enterprises are expected to implement the following measures, with additional requirements for PRC enterprises and SOEs:10
- Compliance systems and investigations. Establish and improve integrity-compliance systems and operating mechanisms, integrate compliance into business decision-making, execution, and supervision, and promptly investigate and address violations.
- Risk assessment and internal reporting. Identify and assess cross-border integrity risks, maintain internal reporting mechanisms, provide timely warnings, and address identified risks through targeted monitoring and improvements.
- Reporting to authorities. Report suspected cross-border corruption, when discovered, to supervisory, public-security, or other relevant authorities in accordance with the law.
- Financial and accounting controls. Maintain financial and accounting systems and authentic, complete accounting records; do not use accounting practices to commit, disguise, or conceal cross-border corruption.
- Third-party oversight. Conduct due diligence on engaged third parties, supervise and manage them, and maintain integrity-risk controls over third parties. Require third-party representatives to comply with the enterprises’ integrity standards; do not use third parties to commit cross-border corruption.
- Employee education. Strengthen employees' integrity education and awareness.
- Additional requirements for PRC enterprises. Allocate compliance departments or personnel tailored for enterprise size, business scope, and risk; supervise and guide overseas branches and subsidiaries in complying with local law; strengthen their financial management and internal audit systems; require them to implement enterprise third-party oversight rules; and train employees in cross-border business departments and overseas operations.11
- Additional requirements for SOEs. Strengthen controls over key overseas positions, significant funds, and major projects, including direct appointment of overseas finance heads, rotation of overseas personnel, and conflicts-of-interest safeguards in accordance with applicable rules.12
- Compliance-System Failures. Failure to satisfy the Law's integrity-compliance requirements may give rise to regulatory consequences independently of any finding of underlying corruption. Where a covered enterprise fails to fulfill its compliance obligations, the competent authority may order corrective action within a specified period.13 Refusal to rectify may result in suspension of relevant business activities, suspension of operations for rectification, or revocation of relevant business permits.14 This framework is significant because it allows regulators to take action based on deficiencies in compliance systems themselves, rather than waiting for a corruption violation to be established.
Reporting suspected cross-border corruption
The Law directs covered enterprises discovering suspected cross-border corruption to report to the relevant PRC authorities "in accordance with the law."15 This is not merely an invitation to cooperate voluntarily. The provision overlaps with existing PRC reporting duties, including the Criminal Procedure Law's general duty to report discovered criminal facts or suspects.16 However, the Law does not specify a detailed suspicion threshold, reporting deadline, or procedure. Its trigger, timing, and relationship with existing reporting rules require case-specific assessment. Companies should assess reporting obligations promptly rather than assume that completion of an internal investigation is a prerequisite to reporting.
The Law permits lighter or reduced administrative penalties or disciplinary sanctions in specified circumstances, including voluntary surrender and truthful confession; active cooperation and voluntary provision of relevant materials; and proactive remediation, active return of illicit gains, and effective reduction or avoidance of loss.17 A report alone does not automatically satisfy these conditions or confer criminal immunity.
Although the Law provides for an order to correct failures to fulfill integrity-compliance duties, followed by possible business suspension or permit revocation where the enterprise refuses to rectify the non-compliance,18 how that framework will apply to reporting failures remains unclear. Companies should carefully assess and coordinate PRC reporting with overseas obligations and potential voluntary-disclosure benefits, including the timing, sequence, and content of disclosures.
Comparison with the FCPA
As many multinational compliance programs are designed around the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), the differences between the FCPA and the Law warrant particular attention. While the two frameworks share certain objectives, they differ in important respects:
- Coverage and conduct. The FCPA's anti-bribery provisions address improper payments made to specified foreign public or political recipients to obtain, retain, or direct business.19 Covered payers include issuers, U.S. domestic concerns, and certain other persons acting while in U.S. territory. The statute generally does not address commercial bribery or broader categories of official misconduct. The Foreign Extortion Prevention Act separately addresses the solicitation and acceptance of bribes by foreign officials, subject to its own elements and jurisdictional nexus.20 By contrast, the Law addresses a broader range of conduct, including specified receipt of bribes, certain duty-related misconduct, overseas flight, and corruption-related asset transfers. As discussed above, the Law operates alongside existing PRC criminal, supervisory, administrative, and commercial anti-corruption regimes rather than functioning solely as an anti-bribery statute.
- Payments and defenses. A payment that may be defensible under the FCPA should not automatically be assumed permissible under applicable PRC law. The FCPA contains a narrow facilitating payment exception for routine governmental actions, as well as affirmative defenses for payments lawful under the foreign country's written laws and regulations, and reasonable, bona fide expenditures directly related to product promotion or contract performance.21 The Law contains no equivalent express provisions. Companies should therefore exercise caution in assuming that conduct viewed as permissible under the FCPA would necessarily be treated similarly under the PRC framework.
- Accounting controls and compliance programs. The FCPA imposes books-and-records and internal-accounting-control obligations on covered issuers, which may be enforced independently of any proven bribery violation.22 The Law similarly requires covered enterprises to establish and improve financial and accounting systems, maintain authentic and complete accounting records and refrain from using accounting practices to facilitate, conceal or disguise cross-border corruption.23 The Law therefore contains recordkeeping and accounting-control requirements broadly analogous to certain aspects of the FCPA's accounting provisions. A more significant distinction lies in the treatment of compliance programs. While the FCPA does not impose a freestanding statutory obligation to maintain a compliance program, the Law expressly requires covered enterprises to implement specified compliance measures. Those obligations carry independent regulatory significance under the Law. Multinational groups whose compliance frameworks were designed principally around FCPA requirements should therefore not assume that those frameworks satisfy the Law's specific requirements without further review.
Restrictions on overseas enforcement and information transfers
Article 25 provides that, without consent from the relevant PRC authorities, overseas institutions, organizations, and individuals may not conduct cross-border corruption investigations or related enforcement activities, directly or through others. It further provides that institutions, organizations, and individuals in China, including the China branches and subsidiaries of multinational groups, may not provide overseas parties with evidentiary materials, data or other related assistance without that consent. Violations may lead to blocking or other corresponding measures and legal liability under applicable rules.24
The provision is likely to be particularly relevant to investigations involving potential disclosures to overseas regulators or enforcement authorities. Read in context, the investigation limb of Article 25 appears directed primarily at overseas enforcement activity rather than bona fide internal compliance fact-finding. The reference to "调查等执法活动" characterizes investigations as part of enforcement activities, while Article 30 separately requires covered enterprises to investigate and address suspected violations promptly. However, the Law contains no express safe harbor for internal investigations, and the separate restriction under Article 25 on providing evidence, data, or other assistance overseas is drafted broadly.25 Whether a particular activity falls within Article 25 is therefore likely to require a fact-specific assessment of its purpose, direction, intended recipients, and information flows. Characterizing an investigation as "internal" will not, by itself, eliminate regulatory risk.
The issue is particularly important because an internal investigation may subsequently lead a company to consider disclosure to an overseas authority, whether to comply with a legal obligation, respond to a regulatory inquiry, or seek voluntary-disclosure credit. The decision to conduct an internal investigation and the decision to disclose information outside China should therefore be analyzed separately. Any proposed disclosure should be assessed before investigation findings, supporting documents, data, interview materials, or other assistance are shared overseas, taking into account applicable PRC consent or approval requirements, other information-transfer restrictions, and relevant overseas obligations and potential enforcement considerations.
Article 25 should also be considered alongside other PRC legal regimes. The Data Security Law and Personal Information Protection Law require approval from the competent PRC authorities for specified disclosures of China-stored data and personal information to foreign judicial or law-enforcement bodies.26 The International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law separately requires consent from the competent PRC authorities for foreign criminal-procedure activities in China and the provision from China of evidence or assistance falling within the scope of that statute.27 Accordingly, Article 25 is unlikely to be assessed in isolation where cross-border investigations or disclosures are contemplated.
Countermeasures and potential conflicts
The Law links anti-corruption enforcement to China's broader countermeasures framework. Article 6 addresses circumstances in which foreign states use anti-corruption measures as a pretext or apply domestic laws extraterritorially in an improper manner to contain or suppress China or impose discriminatory restrictions or other measures that harm China's sovereignty, security, or development interests. In such circumstances, the Law contemplates the use of countermeasures, including measures available under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and other applicable PRC legal frameworks. We have discussed the related framework in our separate alert.28
Although the provision reflects China's increasing focus on responding to perceived extraterritorial overreach, the Law does not automatically characterize every FCPA investigation, overseas anti-corruption inquiry, or foreign enforcement action as improper. Nor does it resolve the practical tension that companies may face when attempting to comply simultaneously with PRC requirements and overseas legal or regulatory obligations.
For multinational groups, the principal challenge is likely to arise where overseas authorities seek access to China-based documents, data, or investigative findings. Requests of this nature may engage multiple PRC legal regimes, including the Law's restrictions on overseas enforcement activity and information transfers. Companies should therefore carefully assess both PRC and overseas legal requirements before responding to requests for China-held materials, interviews with China-based personnel, investigative assistance, or other forms of cooperation.
Enforcement framework and procedural safeguards
Enforcement Coordination. The Law establishes a national coordination mechanism led by the National Commission of Supervision, with participation from relevant State Council departments, agencies, and other authorities. The mechanism is intended to facilitate coordination, information sharing, and international cooperation in cross-border anti-corruption matters.29 As a result, a corruption issue may come to the attention of authorities through financial monitoring, audits, tax supervision, customs reviews, or other regulatory channels, rather than solely through a corruption complaint or whistleblower report.
Cooperation Obligations and Investigative Measures. Organizations and individuals in China, including foreign-invested subsidiaries and their personnel, must cooperate with lawful inquiries and evidence collection requests, and provide truthful information and materials. In major cases, authorities may also require cooperation from foreign enterprises, organizations, and individuals on a reciprocal basis, although the Law does not elaborate on how reciprocity would be assessed or how such requirements would operate in practice outside China.30 The Law further contemplates a range of investigative and enforcement measures. Refusal to provide evidence, concealment, fabrication or destruction of evidence, and refusal to cooperate with or obstruction of investigations may result in correction orders and, where the applicable legal requirements are met, public-security penalties or criminal liability.31 To prevent suspected corrupt persons from leaving China, authorities may impose exit restrictions in accordance with statutory conditions and procedures. Such restrictions must be lifted promptly when no longer necessary.32
Procedural Safeguards. The Law also incorporates a number of procedural protections. Relevant authorities and their personnel are required to protect state secrets, work secrets, trade secrets, personal privacy, and personal information obtained in the course of cross-border anti-corruption work.33 More broadly, enforcement activities must be conducted in accordance with statutory procedures, respect and protect human rights, and afford equal protection to the lawful rights and interests of business entities.34 Evidence obtained through international cooperation or judicial-assistance channels remains subject to applicable admissibility requirements, as well as restrictions arising under treaties, international agreements, or other undertakings.
Liability for Underlying Conduct. The Law operates alongside existing criminal, administrative, disciplinary, civil, and regulatory frameworks applicable to underlying corruption and related misconduct.35 Although disclosure, cooperation, and remediation may support mitigation of certain administrative or disciplinary consequences, the Law does not establish an adequate-compliance defense or guarantee immunity from criminal or administrative liability.36
Practical implications for companies
Companies with operations, personnel, counterparties, or data connected to China should assess whether existing compliance, reporting, investigation, and information-governance processes adequately address the Law's requirements. Particular attention should be paid to situations in which PRC obligations may interact or conflict with reporting, disclosure, cooperation, or information-sharing requirements in other jurisdictions.
Establish Clear Escalation and Decision-Making Procedures
Ensure that suspected corruption matters, proposed reports, government inquiries, requests for investigative materials, and potential overseas disclosures are escalated promptly to appropriate legal and compliance personnel. Reporting and disclosure decisions should be coordinated across relevant jurisdictions, with clear responsibility assigned for assessing PRC reporting obligations, required approvals or consents, evidence preservation, and interactions with regulatory authorities. Dawn-raid protocols should address overseas authorities' requests for remote access to China-stored data by setting out procedures for assessing applicable restrictions and, where appropriate and legally available, raising objections, seeking time for approvals, or proposing lawful alternatives without obstructing lawful enforcement activity. Early coordination may be especially important where matters involve multiple regulators, parallel inquiries, voluntary disclosures, or competing legal obligations.
Test Compliance Controls and Investigation Protocols
Identify the entities within the corporate group that fall within the Law's scope and assess whether existing compliance measures operate effectively in practice. Particular attention should be given to risk assessment processes, internal reporting mechanisms, financial controls, third-party oversight, employee training, and investigation procedures. Ongoing and future investigations should be reviewed to determine who directs the investigation, who may access collected information, whether that information is stored in China, whether materials may ultimately be transferred outside China, and whether existing protocols adequately address the Law's requirements. Existing procedures developed principally by reference to the FCPA, the UK Bribery Act, or other international frameworks should be reviewed to determine whether they adequately address PRC-specific reporting, investigation, and information-transfer considerations.
Review Information-Sharing and Contractual Arrangements
Review intra-group arrangements, customer and supplier agreements, audit rights, cooperation provisions, data-sharing terms, and reporting obligations that may require information to be transferred from China. Assess whether existing contractual frameworks appropriately address PRC approval requirements and provide mechanisms for managing conflicts between PRC restrictions and overseas legal, regulatory, or contractual obligations. Particular attention should be paid to arrangements involving disclosures to headquarters, overseas affiliates, external advisers, auditors, counterparties, or regulatory authorities. Contractual arrangements cannot override statutory requirements and should therefore be reviewed in conjunction with applicable regulatory requirements and legal advice.
Conclusion
The Law marks an important step in China's efforts to strengthen its cross-border anti-corruption framework. Although many aspects of its implementation remain to be clarified, its significance extends beyond corruption enforcement itself. The Law introduces compliance, reporting, investigative, and cross-border cooperation considerations that multinational companies will need to incorporate into their broader governance and regulatory-risk management frameworks. As implementation and enforcement practices develop, organizations operating across jurisdictions may increasingly need to assess PRC and overseas legal, regulatory, and compliance requirements in a coordinated manner, particularly where reporting, investigative, or information-sharing obligations span multiple jurisdictions.
1 For purposes of this alert, “China” and “PRC” are used interchangeably to refer to mainland China, excluding Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.
2 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国刑法) (as amended Dec. 29, 2023 and effective March 1, 2024), arts. 6–10, 163–64, 389–93; Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国反不正当竞争法) (as revised June 27, 2025, effective Oct. 15, 2025), arts. 8, 24, 40.
3 Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国反跨境腐败法) (promulgated Nov. 6, 2026, Presidential Order No. 89, effective Nov. 6, 2026), art. 2(3)–(4) [hereinafter “Law”].
4 Id. art. 2(1).
5 Id. art. 2(2).
6 Id. art. 2(3).
7 Id. art. 2(4).
8 Id. art. 2(5).
9 Id. arts. 29–34.
10 Id. arts. 29–34.
11 Id. arts. 30, para. 2; 32, para. 2; 33, para. 2; 34, para. 2.
12 Id. art. 31, para. 2.
13 Id. art. 45.
14 Id.
15 Id. art. 31, para. 1.
16 Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法) (as amended Oct. 26, 2018), art. 110, para. 1.
17 Law, art. 43(1)–(3).
18 Id. art. 45.
19 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), (g), 78dd-2(a), (h)(1), (i), 78dd-3(a), (f)(1); U.S. Dep’t of Justice & U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 9–11, 19–21 (2d ed. 2020) [hereinafter ”FCPA Resource Guide”].
20 Foreign Extortion Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1352(a), (b)(1), (b)(3).
21 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b)–(c), (f)(3), 78dd-2(b)–(c), (h)(4), 78dd-3(b)–(c), (f)(4); FCPA Resource Guide at 23–26.
22 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)–(B); FCPA Resource Guide at 38–40, 43.
23 Law, art. 32.
24 Id. art. 25.
25 Id. arts. 25; 30, para. 1; compare Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law (Public-Consultation Draft) (中华人民共和国反跨境腐败法(草案)), art. 26.
26 Data Security Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国数据安全法) (promulgated June 10, 2021, effective Sept. 1, 2021), art. 36; Personal Information Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国个人信息保护法) (promulgated Aug. 20, 2021, effective Nov. 1, 2021), art. 41.
27 International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国国际刑事司法协助法) (promulgated and effective Oct. 26, 2018), art. 4.
28 https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/china-issues-new-countering-improper-extraterritorial-jurisdiction-regulations.
29 Law, arts. 7–8.
30 Id. art. 17.
31 Id. art. 44.
32 Id. art. 18.
33 Id. art. 15, para. 2.
34 Id. art. 5.
35 Id. arts. 35–39.
36 Id. arts. 35–39, 43, 45
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