On April 21, 2026, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a preliminary injunction pausing the implementation of five federal agency actions concerning renewable energy development in the United States. While the decision may temporarily relieve some barriers to project development, the decision is only a preliminary injunction, and the case continues. The following alert explains the court’s decision and discusses how it is likely to affect renewable energy permitting and development in the near future.
Background
In 2025, the Department of the Interior issued the following orders and memoranda to implement a series of Executive Orders issued by the White House (collectively, the “Actions”):
- A July 15, 2025 memorandum issued by the U.S. Department of the Interior (“DOI”) entitled "Departmental Review Procedures for Decisions, Actions, Consultations, and Other Undertakings Related to Wind and Solar Energy Facilities", which established a review procedure for all DOI agency actions related to wind and solar energy facilities (the “DOI Review Procedures Memo”);
- A July 2025 announcement by the U.S Fish & Wildlife Service that solar and wind projects cannot use the IPaC website prior to undergoing the review procedures outlined in the DOI Review Procedures Memo (the “IpaC Ban”);
- DOI Secretarial Order No. 3438 entitled "Managing Federal Energy Resources and Protecting the Environment", which restricts DOI’s ability to approve energy projects based on a project’s “capacity density” (the “DOI Land Order”);
- A September 18, 2025 memorandum issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers entitled "Direction on Reviewing Permit Applications Related to Energy Generation Projects", requiring the Corps to prioritize processing Clean Water Act and River and Harbors Act permit applications for projects with higher capacity densities (“Corps’ Memo”); and
- A May 1, 2025 opinion from the DOI’s then-Acting Solicitor entitled "Withdrawal of Solicitor’s Opinion M-37067 and Reinstatement of M-Opinion 37059, Secretary’s Duty to Prevent Interference with Reasonable Uses of Exclusive Economic Zone, the High Seas, and the Territorial Seas in Accordance with Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Subsection 8(p), Alternate Energy-related Uses on the outer Continental Shelf" (“Solicitor Opinion”).
The Actions, collectively, are alleged to have slowed down renewable energy development in the United States by delaying the issuance of federal permits.
On December 23, 2025, several regional organizations representing renewable energy developers1 filed a complaint in the District Court of Massachusetts seeking a declaration that the Actions violated the Administrative Procedures Act, and seeking temporary and permanent injunctions against their implementation.2 The administration argued in response that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit, and that the Actions did not constitute final agency actions that were subject to challenge.
The Decision
After concluding that plaintiffs did have standing to challenge the Actions, the court addressed the merits of the plaintiffs’ arguments. For a court to issue a preliminary injunction in a case seeking to overturn federal agency action, the plaintiff must prove (a) that the action taken is a “final agency action,” (b) that the plaintiff is likely to be successful on the merits of the case, (c) that irreparable harm will occur to the plaintiff in the absence of an injunction, (d) that the issuance of an injunction will burden the defendant less than denying an injunction would burden the plaintiff (the balancing of the equities), and (e) the effect of the injunction, if any, on the public interest.
The court first assessed each of the Actions at issue and concluded that all of them were final agency actions, as they marked the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process and were actions by which rights or obligations have been determined or from which legal consequences will flow. The court was persuaded by case law stating that actions that alter the status quo and do not provide a fixed timeline for further agency action or an anticipated end date are frequently found to be final agency action.
As to the merits of the case, the plaintiffs asserted that each of the Actions was arbitrary and capricious, contrary to applicable law, and not promulgated through the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures. The court noted that an agency rule is arbitrary and capricious under Supreme Court precedent if the agency “has relied on factors that Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” The court also cited Supreme Court authority to point out that the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard requires that agency action be reasonable and reasonably explained, meaning that the agency’s reasons must be set forth with such clarity as to be understandable. In instances where past agency actions have “engendered serious reliance interests,” the agency may be required to provide a more detailed justification.
For all but the DOI Land Order, the court concluded that the Actions were arbitrary and capricious. The court relied almost exclusively on the lack of detail in the Actions (other than the DOI Land Order) for its decision. It pointed out that none of the Actions contained an explanation for the agencies’ changed procedures, other than to say that they were consistent with the White House’s Executive Orders (or in the case of the IPaC Ban, the DOI Review Procedures Memo). For the Solicitor Opinion, the court also noted that the Opinion failed to discuss how it would affect developers that had relied on DOI’s prior permitting procedures.
Although the court did not find that the DOI Land Order was arbitrary and capricious, it did find that it was contrary to law. The court pointed out that § 8(p)(4) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) requires DOI to ensure that all authorized activities within the Outer Continental Shelf are carried out in a manner consistent with twelve specific enumerated goals. The court held that the DOI Land Order’s restriction on offshore projects with lower capacity density contradicts the statutory obligation to consider those twelve goals. Similarly, the court found the DOI Land Order’s disregard of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act’s statutory requirement to balance competing uses of federal land to also be contrary to law.
Since the court found that the Actions were either arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law, it did not address the plaintiffs’ other arguments. After noting that irreparable harm to plaintiffs was likely due to the lack of any potential recovery against the government (due to sovereign immunity), and that the balance of the equities favored the plaintiffs, the court issued the preliminary injunction requested by the plaintiffs.
The Relief Granted
The plaintiffs’ initial complaint requested an order enjoining the agencies from implementing any of the Actions with respect to any project or permit application. However, in their reply brief, the plaintiffs narrowed their request to an order enjoining the agencies from implementing or giving effect to the Actions with respect to just the members of the plaintiff organizations in the case (and plaintiff Green Energy Consumers Alliance - which is not a member-based advocacy organization). The court pointed out that this limited relief is more consistent with the recent Trump v. CASA, Inc. matter, where the Supreme Court imposed greater restrictions on nationwide injunctions. Thus, the Preliminary Injunction issued by the court only enjoined application of the Actions to the members of the plaintiff organizations and the Green Energy Consumers Alliance, Inc.
Looking Forward
We note that the injunction issued in the case is only a preliminary injunction, and not a permanent one. Thus, the case continues and further arguments are likely to be made before the court will determine whether a permanent injunction will be issued. Appeals of decisions in this case are likely and will take months to resolve.
It is also important to note that the injunction only applies to the specific members of the plaintiff organizations and the Green Energy Consumers Alliance. It remains to be seen whether the agencies will apply the injunction across the board to all projects, or only to those projects where the developer can demonstrate they are a member of the applicable organizations. But developers that are members of the plaintiff organizations and have had projects delayed by the applicable federal agencies should promptly contact the agencies and let them know they are covered by the injunction to attempt to get their projects moving again.
The limited basis of the judge’s opinion is noteworthy here as well. As discussed above, the decision was based almost exclusively on the grounds that the agencies did not adequately explain the reasoning behind the Actions. It is certainly plausible that, in response to the decision, the agencies could revoke the Actions and re-issue them with more discussion in order to address this issue. This could have the effect of rendering this decision moot, and requiring a new action to allow a judge to more fully consider whether the revised actions are arbitrary and capricious for other reasons, contrary to applicable law, or a violation of APA procedures.
In sum, we expect this decision is just one step towards the resolution of the federal restrictions on renewable energy development, and much more is to come. Stay tuned.
1 The plaintiffs in the case are the members of RENEW Northeast, Mid-Atlantic Renewable Energy Coalition Action, Alliance for Clean Energy-New York, Renewable Northwest, Southern Renewable Energy Association, Interwest Energy Alliance, Clean Grid Alliance, Carolinas Clean Energy Business Association, and the Green Energy Consumers Alliance, Inc.
2 The case is RENEW Northeast v. U.S. Department of the Interior, Case No. 25-cv-13691.
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