The global LNG market is navigating one of its most consequential periods since the shale revolution transformed the US into a major energy exporter.
A confluence of forces - geopolitical disruption, an energy transition proceeding at an uneven pace, surging electricity demand from AI and data center infrastructure, and intensifying competition among export project developers - has reshaped the commercial and regulatory landscape in ways that are acutely felt across two of the world's most significant LNG regions: the Americas and Asia-Pacific. This article summarizes recent developments in each region.
The Americas
United States
Even before recent events in the Middle East, the US had firmly established itself as the driver of global LNG supply growth. Given the number of US projects, competition for offtakers has been and remains fierce. On top of this, a structural competition has recently emerged between LNG export infrastructure and the domestic buildout of power generation capacity to serve data centers and AI facilities. Both sectors are drawing from the same pool of feed gas supply, EPC contractor capacity, and project finance capital.1
For LNG developers, this competition represents a new headwind. Notwithstanding these dynamics, despite having procured significant offtake and being in advanced discussions for equity investment, Energy Transfer suspended its Lake Charles LNG project, citing more favorable opportunities in pipeline and other capital projects, albeit the company remains open to another party taking over and restarting the project.
With the conflict in the Middle East curtailing shipping for 20% of worldwide LNG supplies and damaging Qatar's Ras Laffan LNG capacity, commentators believe that more buyers will be seeking new supply sources. What has materialized to date is existing buyers increasing their commitments. Following the suspension of Lake Charles LNG, Shell recently announced the acquisition of Canadian producer ARC Resources, which has committed to 1.5mtpa of capacity at Cedar LNG; Chevron has yet to announce another major US LNG arrangement.
On the other hand, EQT and Glencore both increased the quantities under their respective sale and purchase agreements (SPA) with Commonwealth LNG, after JERA terminated its SPA with the project.2 With the increased commitments, Commonwealth LNG announced that it has secured 8mtpa and will launch financing. Expand Energy has also announced a new SPA for phase 1 of Delfin LNG, while terminating its existing SPA for phase 2; the new SPA is 1.15mtpa, as compared to 0.5mtpa under the terminated SPA. Glenfarne Group has also announced a commitment of 1.5mtpa by its marketing affiliate Glenfarne Global Commodities from its Texas LNG project, which will enable the project to begin its financing process.
While LNG developers are often focused on securing sufficient offtake, even when offtake is secured, a positive final investment decision is not guaranteed. This past year, a small-scale LNG developer Stabilis Solutions launched financing and the lenders required amendments to a key offtake agreement as a condition to financial close. The offtaker declined to agree to the requested amendments, and the financing was abandoned.3 While this is an extreme case, it illustrates the many pieces required for a successful FID.
The sustained higher interest rate environment has also materially increased the cost of debt, complicating the economics of projects that depend on long-term, fixed-price debt structures to underpin their equity returns. Construction risk has also sharpened lender focus: the Zachry bankruptcy has underscored the importance of contractor credit quality and the adequacy of completion support mechanisms in LNG project financings.
Export credit agencies such as JBIC and KEXIM remain relevant where projects have offtake counterparties in their respective jurisdictions, but the more notable development in US LNG financing has been the emergence of private credit. Infrastructure debt funds and private lending platforms are now offering bespoke financing structures that can complement or substitute for traditional bank lending, providing greater flexibility on tenor, amortisation profiles, and covenant structures than conventional syndicated facilities. Private credit played key roles in the financing of Port Arthur LNG Phase 2, and market participants expect its role to expand as the next wave of US projects approaches financial close.
On the regulatory front, the Trump administration swiftly pivoted away from hydrogen, ammonia and carbon emission reductions and cancelled Department of Energy awards for green energy and clean tech4 and instead, it has signaled support for oil. The US has also finalized an agreement for Japan to invest US$550bn to fund energy and other select industries in the US.5 In April 2026, president Donald Trump invoked Section 303 of the Defense Production Act to classify the expansion of domestic natural gas and LNG infrastructure as essential to national security6 and authorised the Department of Energy to provide financial incentives, including loans and purchase commitments, to accelerate the construction of transmission pipelines, processing plants, and liquefaction terminals. The more favorable regulatory climate should be welcomed by the slew of new LNG projects under development, such as Coastal Bend LNG, Argent LNG and ST LNG.
The administration has also pursued bilateral energy agreements with counterparts in Europe, Japan, South Korea, and South-East Asia, framing LNG exports as a tool of economic statecraft. While the imposition of broad import tariffs in 2025 and retaliatory measures by trading partners introduced uncertainty into supply chain planning, LNG itself has generally been carved out of or treated favorably under the tariff frameworks, reflecting its strategic importance as an export commodity.
Rest of the Americas
Canada
The country has officially transitioned into a LNG exporter, after LNG Canada Phase 1 shipped its inaugural cargo in late June 2025 and its second train commenced production in November 2025.7
Two other projects are under construction. Woodfibre LNG is on track for a 2027 startup, having recently achieved a milestone with the arrival of its core liquefaction module in early 20268 and the Haisla Nation-led Cedar LNG is expecting commercial operations in late 2028.9 The future pipeline of projects is bolstered by recent regulatory milestones: the Ksi Lisims LNG project cleared a major hurdle in September 2025 when it received environmental approvals from both the British Columbia and Canadian governments, targeting first production by 2029, and the industry is monitoring for a potential FID on LNG Canada Phase 2, which would double the Kitimat site's output to 28mtpa. To support this growth, the federal government approved a US$4bn expansion of the Sunrise natural gas pipeline on April 24, 2026, to ensure adequate feedstock for these burgeoning export hubs. The Canadian government is also launching the Canada Strong Fund, its first sovereign wealth fund which will be capitalized over three years to a total of US$25bn; the fund's mandate will include investments in mining and energy.10
Mexico
New Fortress Energy's Fast LNG (FLNG1) off Altamira began operations in 2024, with a second unit expected in early 2026.11 Sempra Infrastructure's Energia Costa Azul (ECA) Phase 1 is also nearing completion in Baja California, with first production slated for the spring of 2026.12 While Mexico Pacific Limited has been largely silent after its prior sponsor Quantum sold the project in early 2025, two other greenfield projects have been making the news.13 Following the start of the Middle East conflict, the Amigo LNG project in Sonora signed up International Resources Holding as another offtaker and is focused on securing secondary permits required in Mexico to launch financing.14 Meanwhile, Gato Negro LNG expanded its capacity to 9mtpa over three phases and targets FID for late 2026.15
South America
Across the continent, the focus is split between massive resource monetisation and energy security. In Argentina, state-run YPF is leveraging the Vaca Muerta shale formation, one of the world's largest unconventional gas reserves, to support its US$20bn LNG export project.16 Furthermore, a partnership between YPF and Golar LNG has already secured floating liquefaction vessels, with the Hilli Episeyo vessel expected to begin operations by late 2027 to jumpstart exports.17
In contrast, countries like Colombia and Brazil are prioritising LNG infrastructure to safeguard against domestic energy shortages. Colombia is advancing several projects, including the Buenaventura LNG terminal, to address a projected gas deficit by mid- 2026.18 Brazil continues to maintain the region's most robust regasification network, using its 41.64mtpa capacity as a critical backstop for its hydroelectric grid during periods of drought.19 Collectively, these developments represent a hundred-billion-dollar race to integrate Latin America into the global gas market through both export terminals and strategic import hubs.20
APAC
Japan
The country sits at the epicentre of the global LNG market's current uncertainties. As the world's second-largest LNG importer21 , it has long been the anchor buyer underpinning the commercial viability of projects from Queensland to Louisiana - yet recent geopolitical shocks, structural supply dependencies, and rising demand from data centres and semiconductor manufacturing have prompted a re-evaluation of national energy strategy.
Japan's 7th Strategic Energy Plan, issued in February 202522 , marked a substantial departure from its decarbonisation-focused 2021 predecessor, elevating energy security as a central strategic priority. The plan introduced an alternative scenario under which Japan would import more than 74mtpa of LNG by 2040 - compared with 54mtpa to 60mtpa under the baseline - a contingency that has taken on renewed salience in light of the Iran conflict.23
Although Japan's direct exposure to the Strait of Hormuz is relatively modest, approximately 6.3% of total LNG imports, the broader disruption has catalysed a significant policy response. The government established an Energy Response Headquarters tasked with coordinating supply contingency planning and developed a roadmap prioritising LNG stockpiling, supply diversification, and the acceleration of strategic reserves - measures that collectively signal a structural shift in Japan's approach to energy procurement risk.24
Demand dynamics are also shifting. Japan's population is declining and industrial output in traditional heavy sectors has been contracting, yet LNG demand is not following the trajectory that demographic trends might suggest. Two factors principally account for this divergence: the rapid growth of data centre and AI infrastructure, and the persistent shortfall in alternative generation capacity - offshore wind deployment remains far below stated targets, and new nuclear construction takes a minimum of 15 to 20 years. The tension between energy security and decarbonisation is now being articulated at the highest levels of government and industry, with the chairman of the Federation of Electric Power Companies publicly calling for a relaxation of decarbonisation targets in favour of supply security.25
For LNG project developers and their financiers, the implications are significant. Japanese buyers remain among the most creditworthy counterparties in the global LNG market, and their return to longer-term contracting provides the offtake foundation that underpins project bankability. The Japan-US bilateral relationship is a critical dimension: Japanese energy companies have announced their intention to triple LNG imports from the US by 2030, with JERA at the forefront, having signed SPAs and heads of agreements with NextDecade Corporation, Sempra Infrastructure and Cheniere Marketing for up to 4.5mtpa.26 These commitments signal a decisive geographic diversification of Japanese supply portfolios toward the Americas - and provide a powerful commercial anchor for the next wave of US LNG projects seeking to reach FID.
The challenge for developers is to structure contracts that satisfy Japanese buyers' growing preference for destination flexibility and pricing diversity while meeting the revenue certainty thresholds that project finance lenders require.
South Korea
As the world's third-largest LNG importer, South Korea is heavily dependent on imported gas for power generation and industrial feedstock, with no domestic gas production and a geography that makes pipeline imports impractical at scale. Korean buyers spent much of the past decade experimenting with shorter contract tenors and greater spot market exposure, but that approach is now being partially reversed. The Middle East disruption has reinforced the case for supply security, and Korean state energy companies - led by Korea Gas Corporation and the major utilities - are actively pursuing longer-term supply agreements with US, Australian, and Qatari producers. The Korea-US bilateral energy relationship has deepened in parallel with Japan's: KEXIM has signalled its willingness to participate in the financing of US Gulf Coast LNG projects, and Korean offtake commitments are increasingly viewed as a meaningful component of the commercial foundation required for US projects to reach FID.
Korea has set ambitious net-zero targets and is investing in offshore wind, nuclear expansion, and hydrogen, yet the pace of the energy transition has consistently lagged projections. Notably, the share of renewables in Korea's electricity supply remains the lowest among the 32 IEA member countries, and gas- fired generation continues to play an essential role in balancing the grid. As in Japan, the rapid expansion of data centre and AI infrastructure is emerging as a potentially significant new source of gas-fired power demand, with electricity demand from semiconductors and data centres expected to more than double from 2023 to 2030.27
For LNG project developers seeking Korean offtake, the commercial opportunity remains substantial, but buyers are increasingly sophisticated in their contract negotiations, seeking pricing mechanisms that reflect both the current market environment and the longer- term trajectory of carbon pricing and alternative fuel costs.
Singapore, South-East Asia and South Asia
Singapore has consolidated its position as Asia's pre-eminent LNG trading and pricing hub, with the SLInG benchmark gaining traction as a regional pricing reference and the city-state's physical infrastructure supporting a growing portfolio trading and re-export market.28 Major Japanese companies active in the LNG industry have established trading desks in Singapore.29 This development aligns with both Singapore's stated goal of becoming an LNG hub in both the physical and virtual sense and the Japanese government's policy of encouraging the internationalisation of its energy companies' trading capabilities, further embedding Japanese and broader Asian businesses in global LNG supply chains.30
The broader South-East Asian demand story is among the most consequential in the global market. Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand are all developing LNG-to-power infrastructure, driven by rapid economic growth and the need to transition away from coal. Indonesia is expected to shift from gas exporter to importer; LNG imports into Vietnam and the Philippines have grown rapidly since their first unloadings in 2023; and Singapore's imports grew by 13% to six million tonnes in 202431 , feeding surging data centre demand.
Japanese and Korean energy companies and trading houses are playing an increasingly prominent role in the development and financing of these projects - through equity participation, offtake commitments, and EPC involvement - leveraging their established LNG supply chain expertise and relationships with export credit agencies to support infrastructure buildout across the region. The region is widely expected to become a net gas importer by the 2030s, and bilateral energy cooperation frameworks — including memoranda of understanding between the US and several South-East Asian nations - are providing a diplomatic foundation for the commercial relationships that will underpin this import growth.32
The demand picture in South Asia presents a markedly different set of challenges. India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan collectively represent a market with enormous latent demand, yet translating that demand into bankable LNG import projects has proven consistently difficult. India's regasification capacity exceeds 50mtpa, yet utilisation rates remain below nameplate capacity, reflecting the persistent challenge of gas-to-power economics in a market where coal remains the marginal fuel.33 US-India bilateral energy engagement has intensified, but structuring contracts that satisfy both India's regulatory framework and project finance lender requirements remains formidable. Bangladesh and Pakistan have developed LNG import infrastructure but struggle with affordability and offtaker creditworthiness.
For financiers, the risk allocation challenge in South Asian LNG-to-power projects is acute. ECA involvement has been essential in bridging the gap between commercial lender risk appetite and the risk profile of these projects, but the next generation of infrastructure will require continued innovation in credit enhancement and local capital market development.
Australia
Australia remains one of the world's largest LNG exporters, with nameplate liquefaction capacity of approximately 86mtpa.34 Yet the sector faces material structural challenges. Flagship projects - including the North West Shelf (NWS) venture, exporting since 198935 - are contending with declining reservoir pressure and natural field depletion, necessitating third-party gas and backfill arrangements to sustain throughput.36 Woodside's Browse to NWS backfill development has faced repeated delays, with FID not expected before the latter part of the decade.37 The approaching expiry of foundation long-term SPAs - particularly those associated with NWS and Darwin LNG during the 2025-2030 period - compounds the supply-side challenge. Buyers now demand greater destination flexibility, more competitive pricing, and enhanced provisions addressing force majeure, emissions reporting, and carbon cost pass-through, while Australian producers' ability to offer firm long-term commitments is constrained by uncertainty over future feedstock availability.
The tension between Australia's LNG export commitments and domestic gas supply obligations has intensified considerably. The Australian Competition & Consumer Commission has repeatedly highlighted the risk of domestic gas shortfalls on the east coast, driven by the diversion of gas to Queensland LNG export facilities and the slow pace of new onshore development. Domestic wholesale gas prices have risen sharply, in some periods approaching LNG netback parity - a level at which domestic industrial users face acute cost pressures. The Australian Energy Market Operator has similarly warned that the southern states face potential supply gaps from as early as 2028 under certain scenarios.38 These dynamics have placed east coast LNG producers under sustained political and regulatory scrutiny, prompting a series of increasingly interventionist policy responses.
The regulatory and political risk environment has become materially more complex. The Australian Government's Mandatory Code of Conduct for the domestic gas market, extended and strengthened in 2025, imposes binding price and supply obligations on east coast LNG producers, requiring them to offer gas domestically on "reasonable" terms before exporting surplus volumes. The code operates alongside the Australian Domestic Gas Security Mechanism, which empowers the Resources Minister to restrict LNG exports in the event of a projected domestic shortfall.39
In Western Australia, a longstanding reservation policy requires LNG proponents to reserve the equivalent of 15% of production for the domestic market40 - a model periodically advocated for federal adoption. The prospect of expanded reservation requirements, combined with emissions reduction obligations under the Safeguard Mechanism reforms, has introduced regulatory uncertainty increasingly reflected in the risk assessments of project finance lenders and equity investors. For international buyers, these developments underscore the importance of reassessing the reliability of Australian supply as a long-term portfolio anchor. SPAs should be structured with robust provisions addressing regulatory change, supply curtailment, and the allocation of costs arising from domestic market obligations.
Papua New Guinea
Papua New Guinea occupies a strategically significant position in the APAC LNG supply landscape. Its geographic proximity to key demand centres in Japan, South Korea, and South-East Asia affords materially shorter shipping distances and correspondingly lower delivered costs relative to competing supply from the US Gulf Coast, the Middle East, or even Australia's North West Shelf.41
The existing PNG LNG project, operated by ExxonMobil with a nameplate capacity of more than 8.3mtpa, has been a reliable supplier to Asian buyers since commencing operations in 2014 and is well integrated into regional supply chains through long-term SPAs with major Japanese and other Asian utilities.42 TotalEnergies' Papua LNG project, which would add approximately 5.6mtpa43 of capacity utilising shared downstream infrastructure with PNG LNG, continues to work towards FID, though the project has encountered delays related to fiscal terms, host government approvals, the reopening of contractor bidding and the finalisation of other commercial and stakeholder arrangements.44
TotalEnergies has characterised the Middle East conflict as providing favourable momentum to sanction the project before year-end.45 Should Papua LNG ultimately reach FID and proceed to construction, the combined output of the two projects would further consolidate PNG's role as a proximate, cost-competitive supply source for APAC importers and support the diversification of buyers' supply portfolios.
Conclusion
The developments surveyed across the Americas and APAC underscore a central theme: the global LNG market is entering a period in which supply security, commercial structuring, and regulatory risk management are converging with unprecedented intensity. In the Americas, the US continues to anchor global supply growth, but developers seeking to make progress in the current friendly regulatory landscape face a more demanding financing environment and intensifying competition for offtakers and feed gas supplies.
Canada and Latin America are adding meaningful new supply and transit capacity, further diversifying the Americas export base. In APAC, the world's largest LNG importers - Japan, South Korea, and the rapidly growing markets of South-East and South Asia - are recalibrating their procurement strategies in response to geopolitical disruption, energy transition imperatives, and the emergence of data centre-driven demand.
Australian exporters, meanwhile, face the dual challenge of sustaining production from maturing assets while navigating an increasingly interventionist domestic regulatory environment. For market participants and their advisers, these dynamics demand a heightened focus on the contractual architecture of LNG transactions to ensure bankability. As the next wave of projects progresses toward FID, the ability to structure transactions that satisfy the evolving expectations of buyers, lenders, export credit agencies, and regulators across multiple jurisdictions will be the defining challenge - and opportunity - for the LNG industry in the years ahead.
1 "Tech Giants' Power Demands Compete with LNG Projects for Resources." Financial Times, 27 Mar. 2025, www.ft.com.
2 Williams, Curtis. "EQT, Glencore Commit to Buy More LNG, Commonwealth Filing Shows." Reuters, 9 Apr. 2026, www. reuters.com/legal/transactional/eqt-glencore-commit-buy-more- lng-commonwealth-filing-shows-2026-04-09/.
3 "Stabilis LNG Financing Collapses After Offtaker Refuses Lender Amendments." Energy Intelligence, 5 Feb. 2025, www. energyintel.com.
4 Plumer, Brad. "Energy Dept. Rescinds Billions in Funding for Climate Technology." The New York Times, 30 May 2025, www. nytimes.com/2025/05/30/climate/energy-dept-climate-tech-awards- cut.html.
5 "Fact Sheet: President Donald J.Trump Secures Unprecedented US-Japan Strategic Trade and Investment Agreement." The White House, 20 July 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures- unprecedented-u-s-japan-strategic-trade-and-investment- agreement/.
6 White House. "Presidential Determination Pursuant to Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as Amended, on Natural Gas Transmission, Processing, Storage, and Liquefied Natural Gas Capacity," April 20, 2026. whitehouse.gov.
7 LNG Canada. "First Cargo Puts Canada on the Map of LNG Exporting Nations." 30 June 2025. lngcanada.ca
8 Journal of Commerce Staff. "Woodfibre LNG Update: Facility's ‘Heart' Comes Ashore as New Module Arrives." Journal of Commerce, 13 Mar. 2026. constructconnect.com
9 Cedar LNG. "Project Overview - Cedar LNG." Accessed 25 Apr. 2026. cedarlng.com
10 "Canada Strong Fund." Department of Finance Canada, 27 Apr. 2026, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/ news/2026/04/canada-strong-fund.html.
11 BNamericas. "Latin America's US$100bn LNG race: Key projects, players." BNamericas, 9 April 2026, bnamericas.com.
12 Sempra Infrastructure. "ECA LNG - Sempra Infrastructure." Accessed 25 Apr. 2026. semprainfrastructure.com
13 Williams-Derry, Clark. "Mexico Pacific Limited: Delays, Turmoil, and Permitting Errors Have Stymied Mexico's Largest LNG Project." Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 24 June 2025, https://ieefa.org/resources/mexico-pacific- limited-delays-turmoil-and-permitting-errors-have-stymied- mexicos-largest.
14 "Mexico's Amigo LNG Nears US$3.5bn FID as Export Demand Soars." BNamericas, 16 Apr. 2026, https://www.bnamericas.com/ en/interviews/mexicos-amigo-lng-nears-us35bn-fid-as-export- demand-soars. Milicic, Dragan. "Another 20-Year LNG Offtake Lands in Mexican Project's Bag." Offshore Energy, 17 Apr. 2026, https://www.offshore-energy.biz/another-20-year-lng-offtake-lands- in-mexican-projects-bag/.
15 "Gato Negro Eyes FID on Mexico LNG Plant in Late 2026." LNG Prime, 22 Oct. 2024, https://lngprime.com/americas/gato- negro-eyes-fid-on-mexico-lng-plant-in-late-2026/165906/.
16 Kern, Michael. "Argentina Sees Greenlight for US$20bn LNG Project in Mid-2026." Oilprice.com, 4 Dec. 2025. oilprice.com
17 Parraga, Marianna. "Argentina's energy exports to reach US$50bn in 2031, YPF says." Reuters, 26 March 2026. reuters.com
18 Petroleum Economist. "Outlook 2026: The Americas forging the future of global LNG supply." 6 Jan. 2026. pemedianetwork.com
19 BNamericas. "Latin America's US$100bn LNG race: Key projects, players." 9 April 2026. bnamericas.com
20 Natural Gas Intelligence. "US Natural Gas Exports to Mexico Poised to Surge in 2026." 9 Jan. 2026. naturalgasintel.com
21 The Agency of Natural Resources and Energy, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, The 7th Strategic Energy Plan (February 2025).
22 The Agency of Natural Resources and Energy, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, The 7th Strategic Energy Plan (February 2025).
23 The Agency of Natural Resources and Energy, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, The 7th Strategic Energy Plan (February 2025).
24 JETRO Business Newsletter. "Japan's dependence on the Strait of Hormuz for LNG imports is 6.3%, and Qatar's share during LNG production suspension is 5.3%", (11 March 2026), available at jetro.go.jp.
25 "Nikkei. FEPC chairman calls to relax decarbonization efforts", (24 April 2026), available at nikkei.com.
26 JERA Co Inc, Annual Report 2025 (20 October 2025), Notable deals or key events, available at jera.co.jp.
27 International Energy Agency, Korea 2025: Energy Policy Review (IEA, November 2025), available at iea.org.
28 The Energy Market Authority, Energy 2050 Committee Report (March 2022).
29 The Japan Times, "Sumitomo's energy arm may set up LNG trading desk in Singapore" (8 January 2026), available at japantimes.co.jp. JERA Co., Inc., JERA Global Markets Company Intro, available at jeragm.com. Kansai Electric Power FTS, About, available at kefts.com.sg.
30 EDB Singapore, Business Insights: "LNG ensures energy security as S'pore works on decarbonisation goals" (18 September 2023), available at edb.gov.sg. The Agency of Natural Resources and Energy, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 31 The 7th Strategic Energy Plan (February 2025). Reuters, "Japanese firms to get more control in LNG JVs with state- backed group" (16 December 2025), available at reuters.com
31 IGU World LNG Report 2025, Section 3.3, "Net LNG Imports by Market". The Energy Market Authority, Singapore Energy Statistics 2025, Chapter 1: Energy Supply, available at ema.gov.sg.
32 IGU World LNG Report 2025, Section 1, State of the LNG Industry, p. 12; Section 7.2, "Receiving Terminal Capacity and Global Utilisation," p. 83 ("Southeast Asia expected to become a net gas importer by the 2030s").
33 ICRA Limited, "Indian Gas Utilities - LNG terminal capacities to remain underutilised for the foreseeable future" (December 2025), available at icra.in.
34 Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, Australian Gas and LNG Tracker (December 2025), available at iea.org.
35 Woodside Energy Group Ltd, Annual Report 2025 (24 February 2026), Section 2.5 - Business Model and Value Chain.
36 Woodside Energy Group Ltd, Annual Report 2025 (24 February 2026), Section 3.1 - Australia.
37 Woodside Energy Group Ltd, Annual Report 2025 (24 February 2026), Section 3.5 - Developments and Exploration.
38 Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), Gas Statement of Opportunities, March 2025 (the 2025 GSOO), Executive Summary, available at aemo.com.au.
39 Australian Government, Department Industry, Sciences and Resources; The Australian Domestic Gas Security Mechanism, available at industry.gov.au.
40 Woodside Energy Group Ltd, Annual Report 2025 (24 February 2026), Section 6.3 - Additional Disclosures.
41 IGU World LNG Report 2025, Figure 6.12, "Major LNG Shipping Routes, 2024".
42 PNG LNG website, About - Project overview, available at pnglng.com.
43 Papua LNG website, At a glance, available at papualng.com. pg.
44 IGU World LNG Report 2025, Section 5.3, "Liquefaction Capacity by Market - Proposed".
45 TotalEnergies, Results 1Q26 - Earnings Call Transcript (26 April 2026), available at totalenergies.com.
The article was first published on PFI on May 19, 2026. For further information please visit LNG in the Americas and APAC | PFI.
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