New nationwide self-disclosure policy cements DOJ’s efforts to encourage corporate cooperation

The Department of Justice ("DOJ") has announced its first-ever Department-wide corporate enforcement policy that applies to all federal corporate criminal cases across the country, except those related to antitrust. The new DOJ Corporate Enforcement Policy ("CEP") closely resembles the DOJ Criminal Division's CEP ("Criminal Division CEP") as updated last year (see our May 12, 2025 Client Alert). The new DOJ-wide CEP supersedes prior component-specific corporate enforcement policies, including the Criminal Division's policy and SDNY's recently-announced program (see our March 6, 2026 Client Alert). Understanding the new policy is critical for corporate legal and compliance departments in weighing the potential benefits, costs, and risks of self-reporting.


On March 10, 2026, the DOJ issued its first Department-wide policy on corporate enforcement, establishing uniform standards and incentives for companies to voluntarily self-disclose misconduct, cooperate, and remediate.¹ As described by DOJ in its announcement, the new policy is designed to "(1) drive early, voluntary self-disclosure of criminal conduct; (2) promote timely and effective enforcement of criminal laws, including holding culpable individuals accountable; (3) reduce harm; (4) facilitate prompt remedial action, including requiring companies to compensate victims and address corporate deficiencies; (5) help ensure consistency across the Department; and (6) transparently describe the Department’s policies and decision making."² This Department-wide CEP also "provides predictability" for companies because it applies to all corporate criminal cases across the Department (excluding those related to antitrust) and supersedes all component-specific or US Attorney's Office-specific corporate enforcement policies currently in place.  

This alert summarizes the development of the DOJ’s corporate self-disclosure policies, identifies the most significant differences between the new policy and its predecessor, the Criminal Division CEP, and provides key takeaways for corporate clients. 

Revisions to the Criminal Division's CEP and Voluntary Self-Disclosure ("VSD") Policies  

The Department-wide CEP represents the latest step in a yearslong effort by the DOJ to encourage companies to voluntarily self-report misconduct, fully cooperate in the government's investigations, and timely and appropriately remediate the harm. Beginning with the Antitrust Division's Corporate Leniency Policy for criminal antitrust cases, which dates to the 1990s, and continuing to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") Pilot Program for FCPA cases in 2016 which ultimately became the Criminal Division CEP, among other efforts, the Department has continued to refine its corporate enforcement and voluntary self-disclosure ("VSD") policies to encourage corporate self-reporting and target individual wrongdoing.⁴  The Criminal Division CEP, updated most recently in 2025, applied to all criminal FCPA cases and other cases within the purview of the DOJ's Criminal Division, but did not apply to all Department components nationwide. Recently, the US Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York ("SDNY") issued its own VSD policy, described in greater detail in our March 6, 2026 Client Alert.⁵  Now, with the announcement of the DOJ-wide CEP, the Department has superseded those policies and created a unified approach to all federal corporate criminal cases nationwide.    

However, the new policy differs from the Criminal Division CEP in several material respects:

1. Recidivism as an aggravating circumstance. The new CEP expands "corporate recidivism" as an aggravating factor that may render a company ineligible for a declination of prosecution. Under the new CEP (as with the Criminal Division CEP), a company that voluntarily self-discloses, fully cooperates, and timely remediates may be ineligible for a declination of prosecution if there are "aggravating circumstances" relating to, among other things, "corporate recidivism."  While the Criminal Division CEP defined recidivism to mean a criminal adjudication or resolution for similar misconduct within previous five years, the new policy defines recidivism to mean a criminal adjudication or resolution (1) for any misconduct within the last five years, irrespective of whether such conduct is similar to the misconduct at issue in the self-report, or (2) for conduct similar to the conduct at issue in the self-report, irrespective of when that prior adjudication or resolution occurred.  
2. Self-reports to other authorities. Because the new CEP applies to all DOJ criminal litigating components and US Attorney's Offices nationwide, the policy establishes that a company must voluntarily self-disclose the misconduct "to the appropriate component of the Department."⁶  The CEP states that "[g]ood faith disclosure to one component where the matter is later brought to another appropriate component for investigation will also qualify."⁷  Moreover, while the CEP generally provides that disclosures made only to "federal regulatory agencies, state and local governments, or civil regulatory agencies" will not qualify as voluntary self-disclosures under the policy, it leaves room for prosecutors to consider "good faith disclosures" to such entities, which "may qualify if appropriate under the circumstances."⁸  The CEP adds that "[i]n all cases, such disclosures may be considered as part of a company's cooperation and remediation," a concept that did not appear in the Criminal Division CEP.⁹  As we noted in a prior client alert, giving companies credit for self-reporting to civil enforcement agencies even in the absence of a self-report to the DOJ creates positive incentives for self-reports.
3. Less credit for "near miss" disclosures. Like the Criminal Division CEP, the new policy provides that if a company fully cooperated and timely and appropriately remediated but is ineligible for a declination because either (1) the self-report did not qualify as voluntary (for example, because the government already knew the information), or (2) there were aggravating factors warranting a criminal resolution, a company is still eligible for a non-prosecution agreement for a term of less than three years without an independent compliance monitor. However, while the Criminal Division CEP provided that such companies would receive a 75% reduction from the low end of the US Sentencing Guidelines fine range, the new policy provides that such companies will receive a reduction of "at least 50% but not more than 75%" off the low end of the range.¹⁰
4. New commentary on "full cooperation." The new CEP revises the definition of "full cooperation" in Appendix B, adding: "The Department will take into consideration the size, sophistication, and financial condition of the cooperating company when assessing the scope, quantity, quality, impact and timing of cooperation."¹¹ This change may benefit smaller companies and companies with fewer resources in demonstrating full cooperation.   

Key Takeaways 

The new DOJ-wide CEP harmonizes disclosure incentives across the Department, seeking to ensure uniformity and consistency in how different Department components and offices address corporate crime. In doing so, it builds on and makes incremental updates to the Criminal Division CEP. Previously, companies considering whether to make a self-report and which DOJ office to contact would assess, among other things, the different benefits available under the Department's various VSD policies, including the Criminal Division CEP, the US Attorney's Offices VSD policy, and the recently announced SDNY policy. Under the new DOJ-wide policy, a company that has decided to self-report will now look to different factors in determining which DOJ office to contact. While foreign corruption matters must still be reported to the Criminal Division, for example, other potential misconduct could be reported to a main DOJ component in Washington, DC, or to any of the US Attorney's Offices nationwide. Companies can now choose to self-report to a particular DOJ component or office on the understanding that they should receive the same benefits irrespective of their choice.

Of course, companies will still need to carefully weigh the potential benefits of self-reporting against the risks of doing so, particularly in light of the new CEP's expanded definition of "corporate recidivism" and the potentially reduced credit for "near miss" voluntary self-disclosures. 

_{1 Department of Justice, Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (effective March 10, 2026), available here.
2 Id. 
3 Department of Justice Release First-Ever Corporate Enforcement Policy for All Criminal Cases (March 10, 2026), available here.
4 Criminal Division Launches New FCPA Pilot Program (2016), available here
5 Criminal Division Memorandum, Focus, Fairness, and Efficiency in the Fight Against White-Collar Crime (May 12, 2025), available here. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id.} 
 

_{White & Case means the international legal practice comprising White & Case LLP, a New York State registered limited liability partnership, White & Case LLP, a limited liability partnership incorporated under English law and all other affiliated partnerships, companies and entities.}

_{This article is prepared for the general information of interested persons. It is not, and does not attempt to be, comprehensive in nature. Due to the general nature of its content, it should not be regarded as legal advice.}

_{© 2026 White & Case LLP}