President Trump orders critical minerals trade negotiations in Section 232 action

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On January 14, 2026, President Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation implementing Section 232 measures to address national security risks associated with imports of processed critical minerals and their derivative products (PCMDPs).1 In the proclamation, President Trump invoked Section 232 authorities to direct the negotiation of agreements to "ensure the United States has adequate critical mineral supplies and to mitigate the supply chain vulnerabilities as quickly as possible."

Unlike the Trump administration’s previous Section 232 actions, the proclamation does not direct the immediate imposition of tariffs on the subject products. Even so, President Trump has reserved the right to impose tariffs on certain PCMDPs in the future, should the negotiations not achieve their intended outcomes.

Critical mineral negotiations 

President Trump is exercising his authority under Section 232 to direct the Department of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to negotiate agreements with US trade partners aimed at addressing the national security risks associated with PCMDPs.

Following the signing of the proclamation, USTR stated, "by negotiating with interested parties to create an economically viable market for critical minerals, we can promote demand for and boost the supply of critical minerals at home and with partner countries."2 However, the proclamation provides limited details on the negotiating strategy, other than instructing negotiators to pursue "price floors for trade in critical minerals and other trade-restricting measures" as part of the agreements. It does not clarify the full scope of the proposed agreements, the minerals and products of focus, or which US trade partners will participate.

Ongoing US efforts to secure access to critical minerals

Recent developments indicate that this proclamation is likely an extension of ongoing diplomatic efforts rather than the launch of a new negotiating process. The Trump administration has intensified its push to diversify sources of critical minerals after China expanded export controls on rare earth elements and other critical minerals during the escalation of the US-China trade disputes in 2025. Since then, President Trump has signed new cooperation agreements and is incorporating mineral supply chain commitments into its agreements on reciprocal trade. These developments reflect the findings of our recent Mining & Metals market sentiment survey, in which 73 percent of respondents said they expect an even greater divergence between the US and China on trade and critical minerals policy over the next 12 months.3

The Trump administration has signed bilateral critical mineral development agreements with Argentina, Australia, Cambodia, Japan, Malaysia, and Thailand, establishing new cooperation frameworks, market access commitments, and identifying potential projects worth over $10 billion. The United States also hosted a business development event with five Central Asian countries, leading to an agreement with Kazakhstan to enhance supply chain resilience and promote new commercial opportunities in the region. These agreements are with both mineral-rich countries, such as Australia and Kazakhstan, and with advanced downstream processing capabilities, like Japan.

Most recently, the Trump administration proposed creating minimum price floors for certain rare earth elements at a G7 finance ministers meeting on January 12, 2026.4 The proposal – which France has said it expects to continue discussing during its G7 presidency this year – appears to still be in its initial stages.

Timeline and potential future tariff actions 

The proclamation directs negotiators to report back on the status of the negotiations within 180 days — by July 13, 2026. If President Trump determines that the agreements are not progressing in a timely manner or are insufficient to address the national security threat, he may implement additional measures, including import restrictions. Besides tariffs, the proclamation mentions that the administration is considering establishing "minimum import prices for specific types of critical minerals." 

Investigation and covered products 

The US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) initiated the Section 232 investigation to determine the effects of PCMDP imports on national security on April 23, 2025, following an executive order by President Trump.5 

Investigation results

BIS has not provided a public copy of the investigation report it submitted to the president. According to the president’s proclamation, the investigation determined that PCMDPs are being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States, providing the legal basis for President Trump’s action. In a summary of the investigation results, the proclamation states:

The Secretary [of Commerce] found that the United States is too reliant on foreign sources of PCMDPs, lacks access to a sufficiently secure and reliable supply chain to PCMDPs, is experiencing unsustainable price volatility with respect to critical mineral markets, and is suffering from weakened domestic manufacturing and production capacity of PCMDPs. The Secretary found that these circumstances are a significant national security vulnerability that could be exploited by foreign actors; weaken the industrial resilience of the United States; expose the American people to supply chain disruptions, economic instability, and strategic vulnerabilities; and jeopardize the United States’ ability to meet demands for PCMDPs that are essential to its national defense and critical infrastructure.

Products covered by the investigation

BIS examined imports of "processed critical minerals" (including rare earth elements and uranium) and "derivative products," based on the definitions and mineral lists provided below. While all these products fall within the scope of the investigation, any specific agreement or future tariff action may not cover the full range of products described here. 

  • Processed critical minerals are defined as "critical minerals that have undergone the activities that occur after critical mineral ore is extracted from a mine up through its conversion into a metal, metal powder or a master alloy. These activities specifically occur beginning from the point at which ores are converted into oxide concentrates; separated into oxides; and converted into metals, metal powders, and master alloys."
  • Derivative products include "all goods that incorporate processed critical minerals as inputs. These goods include semi-finished goods (e.g., anodes and cathodes) as well as final products (e.g., motors, batteries, radar systems, wind turbines and their components, and advanced optical devices)."
  • Critical minerals refer to those listed on the "Critical Minerals List" published by the US Geological Survey (USGS) pursuant to section 7002(c) of the Energy Act of 2020. At the start of the BIS investigation, the list included 50 minerals: aluminum, antimony, arsenic, barite, beryllium, bismuth, cerium, cesium, chromium, cobalt, dysprosium, erbium, europium, fluorspar, gadolinium, gallium, germanium, graphite, hafnium, holmium, indium, iridium, lanthanum, lithium, lutetium, magnesium, manganese, neodymium, nickel, niobium, palladium, platinum, praseodymium, rhodium, rubidium, ruthenium, samarium, scandium, tantalum, tellurium, terbium, thulium, tin, titanium, tungsten, vanadium, ytterbium, yttrium, zinc, and zirconium. In November 2025, USGS added boron, copper, lead, metallurgical coal, phosphate, potash, rhenium, silicon, silver, and uranium to the list.6
  • Uranium is specifically defined as a covered "critical mineral." This is the third Section 232 investigation to examine uranium imports, and the second undertaken under President Trump.
  • Rare earth elements include the 17 elements identified by the Department of Energy in its April 2020 publication "Critical Materials Rare Earths Supply Chain." These are the lanthanide series (lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, and lutetium) as well as scandium and yttrium. Most of these are also on the USGS critical minerals list.7

President Trump’s Section 232 tariff policy 

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 19628 authorizes the president to take action, including imposing import measures and entering into negotiations, to adjust imports of products determined to threaten national security. Presidential action under Section 232 first requires the Department of Commerce to investigate the national security risks associated with the relevant sector. Unlike other US trade remedy laws (such as safeguards, Section 301, antidumping duties, and countervailing duties), the government need not demonstrate a market access violation or economic injury for a Section 232 action.

In 2025, the Trump administration adopted a two-track tariff strategy, (i) imposing "baseline" and "reciprocal" tariffs on most products from most countries under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), apparently seeking to negotiate more favorable market access conditions and altering balances of trade; and (ii) imposing Section 232 tariffs (or other measures) on imports associated with industries the Trump administration views as strategically important to US national and economic security. Unlike most other tariffs President Trump has imposed, the IEEPA reciprocal tariffs and the Section 232 tariffs do not "stack" on top of each other. Instead, when President Trump issues a Section 232 tariff order, he exempts the products from the IEEPA tariffs.

Currently, seven Section 232 tariff orders are in effect, covering most imports of steel and steel derivatives; aluminum and aluminum derivatives; passenger vehicles, light trucks, and parts; copper and copper derivative products; timber, lumber, and wood products; and trucks, buses, and truck parts. Alongside the PCMDP proclamation on January 14, 2025, President Trump issued a proclamation on the Section 232 investigation of semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, which similarly directed the negotiation of agreements instead of immediately imposing general tariffs, but also included a 25% tariff on a narrow set of integrated circuits that are imported for testing and then re-exported to China.9 The administration is also conducting Section 232 investigations to consider new tariffs on pharmaceuticals and ingredients, commercial aircraft, polysilicon, unmanned aircraft systems, wind turbines, medical equipment and personal protective equipment, and industrial machinery and robots.

 

1 Presidential Proclamation of January 14, 2026: "Adjusting Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Their Derivative Products into the United States," and Fact Sheet: "President Donald J. Trump Directs Negotiations to Adjust Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Their Derivative Products into the United States," January 14, 2026.
2 "Ambassador Greer Issues Statement on Launch of Critical Minerals Negotiations," USTR, January 14, 2026.
3 See White & Case’s detailed analysis and a graphical breakdown of the market's perspectives on mining and metals in 2026 in "Mining & metals 2026: Adapting to a policy-driven business cycle."
4 "Secretary Bessent Convenes Finance Ministerial on Securing Critical Minerals Supply Chains," US Department of the Treasury, January 12, 2025.
5 "Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Derivative Products," 90 FR 17372 (April 25, 2025).
6 "Final 2025 List of Critical Minerals," 90 FR 50494 (November 7, 2025).
7 "Critical Materials Rare Earths Supply Chain: A Situational White Paper," US Department of Energy, April 2020.
8 19 U.S.C. §1862, and 15 C.F.R. part 705.
9 Presidential Proclamation of January 14, 2026: "Adjusting Imports of Semiconductors, Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment, and their Derivative Products into the United States."

 

We provide below a list of partners and senior attorneys within the Global International Trade Practice of White & Case. Please contact any of them with questions about this report or other trade issues.

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This article is prepared for the general information of interested persons. It is not, and does not attempt to be, comprehensive in nature. Due to the general nature of its content, it should not be regarded as legal advice.

© 2026 White & Case LLP

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Ian Saccomanno
Ian Saccomanno
Senior Trade Analyst|Washington, DC
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Samuel Scoles
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