Competitor information exchanges: Reducing market uncertainty is what matters, not level of detail

On 9 July 2026, Advocate General Rantos delivered his non-binding opinion in Case C-357/25, Groupama Asigurări v Consiliul Concurenței. The case originates from a decision by the Romanian Competition Council (CC), which found that nine motor vehicle civil liability (MTPL) insurance companies including Groupama Asigurări (Groupama) – together controlling between 80% and 97% of the Romanian MTPL market – had participated in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU over a four-year period. The CC concluded that the companies had coordinated future premium rate increases through the exchange of commercially sensitive information, primarily at meetings of their professional association and through press announcements. Groupama, fined approximately €7.58 million, challenged the decision before the Romanian courts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Groupama’s appeal. On further appeal, Romania’s Supreme Court stayed proceedings and referred two questions to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU): (i) whether establishing a concerted practice requires an exchange of detailed, individualised pricing information on the date, scope and manner of adjustments to pricing behaviour; and (ii) whether a competition authority is required to examine alternative explanations for the rate increases put forward by a company accused of participating in a concerted practice. 

Below we discuss key AG conclusions on each of the referred questions. 

Ability to reduce uncertainty of market participants is what matters

The AG examines whether Article 101(1) TFEU requires an exchange of detailed or individualised information, to establish a concerted practice, or whether more general discussions can suffice. According to the AG, the key test is whether the information exchanged is capable of reducing or eliminating "the degree of uncertainty as to the operation of the market in question" (in line with the test applied in para. 384 of the Horizontal Guidelines and settled EU case law).  The AG specifically notes that the exchanged information does not need to contain precise pricing details or have "direct link to final consumer prices". In particular, the AG noted: 

• Any exchange of confidential information on prices between competitors is, in principle, likely to constitute a concerted practice prohibited by Article 101(1) TFEU, since price is, as a general rule, an essential parameter on the basis of which competition is determined, and such information is therefore strategic in nature.
• The T-Mobile judgment, which referred to unlawful information exchange on "timing, extent and details" of price adjustments does not establish a legal test for what qualifies as illegal information exchange but is rather an example. In other words, it is not that only the exchange of information of certain nature and detail can establish unlawful information exchange. Exchanges lacking that level of detail can still constitute unlawful information exchange, depending on the content of the information and "its ability to reduce or eliminate uncertainty regarding the behavior of market participants, taking into account, in particular the characteristics of that market". 
• The degree of detail remains a relevant factor in assessing the ability to reduce or eliminate competitive uncertainty – the more specific and individualised the pricing information exchange, the more likely it is to be of a strategic nature capable of reducing competitive uncertainty.
• Market context also matters: where price is not the main competitive parameter (such as regulated markets) or where external factors, like commodity price movements, make broad price trends obvious to everyone anyway, price information may not be particularly sensitive. 
• Market characteristics are key to the analysis of whether the exchange constitutes an infringement. Relevant factors are case specific, and there is no exhaustive list of such factors. In the present case, relevant factors include oligopolistic structure and market transparency; demand inelasticity (given the compulsory nature of MTPL insurance); and lack of innovation and the limited bargaining powers of consumers. The AG also noted that, although the MTPL market is subject to regulatory oversight, the companies had in practice meaningful discretion to set rates – as evidenced by the prior period of intense price competition – and the government cap on premiums did not come into force until after the end of the infringement period. Those factors indicated that price was in fact a parameter of competition on the relevant market, even within a regulatory framework. 
• External context such as the significant inter-company debts and regulatory changes that prompted discussions in the present case can inform whether the exchange was purely legitimate – but a legitimate purpose does not, in itself, rule out the characterisation of an exchange as anti-competitive. This is because according to the settled case law, the intention of the undertakings concerned in exchanging information is not a necessary element in establishing whether a concerted practice is restrictive in nature. However, the AG also noted that if one of the meetings was focused entirely on inter-company debt and recourse claims, and any mention of rate increases arose only as a way to address those debts, that discussion might be seen as part of a broader exchange about the state of the market and its regulatory environment, rather than as commercially sensitive price coordination.

Evidence that challenges the very existence of concerted practice is admissible and must be taken into account

Regarding the second referred question, the CC refused to consider Groupama’s evidence labelling it as "alternative explanation" regarding the price increases arguing that such explanation would only be relevant where the CC relied solely on parallel conduct by undertakings to infer the existence of collusion. The CC relied on the judgment in Siemens, on the ground that the concerted practice in question had been established not only based on parallel conduct observed on the market, but also on the basis of other evidence. According to the judgment in Siemens (confirmed on appeal by the CJEU), alternative explanations are irrelevant from the moment when the existence of the infringement is not merely presumed but is established by proof.

The AG made the following observations:

• He identified a crucial distinction that the CC and the Bucharest Court of Appeal had missed – Groupama was not merely offering an alternative explanation for its conduct (i.e. explaining away price increases after the allegedly illegal information exchange): the company was challenging the very existence of concertation in the first place, arguing that (i) the generic nature of the information exchanged meant it could not constitute evidence of price coordination at all, and (ii) its pricing decisions during the relevant period reflected independent, actuarially grounded response to market conditions – not coordination.
• In that regard, AG recalls the settled case law according to which a concerted practice occurs when (i) the companies actually coordinate with each other, (ii) they subsequently behave in a certain way on a market, and (iii) there is a causal link between the coordination and that conduct.  There is a rebuttable presumption as to the third element: if a company participated in an exchange of information and then remained active on the market, it is presumed to have factored that information into its commercial decisions. However, the company can rebut this presumption and when the company puts forward arguments in that respect, such arguments must be admissible. 
• A competition authority cannot rely on the Siemens case law where a company is seeking to contest whether the evidence relied on actually demonstrates the existence of a concerted practice in the first place. Therefore, a competition authority cannot dismiss "alternative" evidence put forward by a company as irrelevant. 

Key Takeaways

The CJEU will have the final say, as the AG opinion is non-binding. Should the CJEU adopt the AG’s reasoning, his analysis provides useful clarification for businesses navigating the boundaries of lawful information exchange.

• Even the exchange of not detailed price information can reduce or eliminate competitive uncertainty, taking into account the characteristics of the relevant market. The longstanding "timing, extent and details" language from the T-Mobile judgment (see above) was never intended as a legal test.
• When challenging a competition authority’s finding, the scope of what evidence an accused company is entitled to put forward depends on what is contested. If the argument is that the authority’s evidence does not demonstrate coordination in the first place, a competition authority cannot dismiss that evidence as irrelevant. Under the AG’s clarification of the Siemens case law, a competition authority may dismiss alternative explanations only if it has gathered sufficient evidence to the requisite legal standard proving the concertation in the first place. Until that threshold is met, companies retain the right to put forward the evidence proving the contrary. 

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