Three football cases before the CJEU - Is the tide turning slightly in favour of sports governing bodies?

On 9 and 16 July 2026, the European Court of Justice ("CJEU") delivered three decisions concerning the compatibility of football governance rules with EU law. In ROGON,¹ the CJEU confirmed that its principles in Wouters and Meca-Medina apply to football agent regulations issued by a football federation, including even those governing third parties. In RRC Sports,² the CJEU examined the FIFA Football Agent Regulations ("FFAR") in detail, viewed positively most of their provisions and confirmed that FIFA has the power to regulate football agents, subject to compliance with EU competition and data protection law. In CONI,³ the CJEU ruled on the compatibility with EU law of sports disciplinary sanctions, confirming that such sanctions may justifiably restrict fundamental freedoms, while also placing important conditions on how Member States must ensure effective judicial protection in sports disciplinary matters.

Key takeaways

• EU competition law, including the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception, applies to football agent regulations. Sports federations can regulate services of non-members such as agents, subject always to the same substantive test (no restriction by object, and in case of restriction by effect, only when it is for a legitimate non-economic objective, subject to the necessity and proportionality requirements).
• FIFA can invoke legitimate objectives to justify its regulations even without any public mandate.
• For the first time, the CJEU examined the FFRA and considered that only very few provisions of the FFAR are restrictions "by object", notably certain aspects of the remuneration forfeiture rule (Article 14(12)(a) FFAR) and the no-approach rules as applied to incumbent agents (Article 16(1)(b) and (c) FFAR).
• RRC Sports is the first CJEU ruling to apply the General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR") to a sports federation's regulatory framework, holding that blanket disclosure of all sanctions regardless of severity and full data disclosure violate the principles of necessity and data minimisation. This could affect how any governing body structures its transparency obligations going forward.
• Extending its ISU and Seraing jurisprudence to sports federations' disciplinary systems, in CONI the CJEU found that such disciplinary systems must be governed by transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria and that EU domestic courts must be able to exercise effective judicial control over decisions resulting from those systems, unless at least one reviewing body within the sports justice system qualifies as a "court or tribunal" within the meaning of EU law, meeting the requirements of independence, impartiality, prior establishment by law, judicial function and effective review powers.

Background to the decisions

The judgments delivered in ROGON, RRC Sports and CONI are the latest additions to a sequence of rulings by the CJEU that have, since December 2023, addressed the relationship between professional sports governance and EU law. The rulings in European Superleague Company ("Superleague", C 333/21), International Skating Union v Commission ("ISU", C 124/21), Royal Antwerp Football Club ("Royal Antwerp", C 680/21), and in Diarra (C 650/22) clarified that regulations that are competition-restricting "by object" fall outside the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception and cannot be justified on sporting grounds (see, e.g., Superleague, paragraph 186), and that Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU") confers no immunity from the competition and free movement rules (Superleague, paragraphs 95 106).

ROGON (C-428/23) and RRC Sports (C-209/23), decided on 9 and 16 July 2026 respectively by the same Fifth Chamber, address the legal status of players' agent regulations at national and international level. CONI, also decided on 16 July 2026 by the same Chamber, extends this line of jurisprudence to sports disciplinary sanctions and the fundamental right to effective judicial protection under Article 19(1) Treaty on European Union ("TEU") and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU ("Charter").

In a similar challenge of the FFAR before the Court of Arbitration for Sport ("CAS"), the CAS found that the fee cap (Article 15(2) of the FFAR) was a restriction "by effect" only and that the challenged provisions met the Wouters/Meca-Medina criteria.⁴

C-428/23 — ROGON GmbH & Co. KG and Others v Deutscher Fußball-Bund eV (DFB)

ROGON was a reference from the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany) under Article 267 TFEU on the interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU in relation to the Reglement für Spielervermittlung (RfSV) of the Deutscher Fussball-Bund ("DFB"), i.e., its regulations governing the activities of players' agents, which imposed registration obligations, required submission to FIFA, DFB and Deutsche Fussball Liga ("DFL") jurisdiction, disclosure of fees and imposition of sanctions for non-compliance, among others. The two questions referred to the CJEU focused on whether the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception applies where a federation's regulations govern non-member third parties (agents), and if so, whether the proportionality assessment must be conducted provision-by-provision.

The CJEU confirmed that Article 101(1) TFEU applies to regulations adopted by a sports federation governing non-member third parties. It held that the DFB may be regarded as having the status of an association of undertakings also with respect to upstream markets, such as for the recruitment of players or trainers, or the services of agents with a view to the transfer of professional players or trainers from one club to another (paragraph 32).

The CJEU recalled with reference to Wouters/Meca-Medina, that not every agreement, decision or practice restricting freedom of action is necessarily prohibited by Article 101(1) TFEU. Such an agreement can be exempted from the prohibition as long as it is not a restriction of competition by object and where (i) the conduct is justified by a legitimate public-interest objective not per se anticompetitive, (ii) the means used are genuinely necessary, which implies that there are no other measures that would be as effective for that purpose whilst being less restrictive of competition, and (iii) the inherent anticompetitive effects are not disproportionate to such an objective, in particular by eliminating all competition on the relevant market. The CJEU held that in the football ecosystem, clubs, national federations, players and agents must interact and cooperate to ensure the viability and attractiveness of the sport, and that regulations pursuing sporting integrity and contractual stability may, by necessity, produce effects on the upstream agents' market without that fact alone preventing application of the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception.

On the second question, the Court held that the conditions of the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception need not be assessed with regard to each individual provision in isolation, but with regard to a set of provisions pursuing a distinct objective or producing a distinct effect, though artificial disaggregation of indissociable or ancillary provisions should be avoided (paragraphs 67–70). The Bundesgerichtshof was left to apply these standards to the individual RfSV provisions.

C-209/23 – FT and RRC Sports GmbH v Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)

This case arose from a reference by the Landgericht Mainz (Regional Court Mainz, Germany) and concerned the compatibility of the FFAR, adopted on 16 December 2022, with Articles 101, 102 and 56 TFEU and Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR. The applicants (an agent and vice-president of the Football Forum agents' association (FT), and RRC Sports GmbH, his German company) sought injunctive relief against 13 specific FFAR provisions covering remuneration caps, multiple representation restrictions, licensing conditions, no-approach rules, and data disclosure obligations.

At the outset, the CJEU confirmed its findings made in ROGON that regulations of sports associations governing services of economic operators related to the professional exercise of the sport, including those, like the FFAR, that regulate agents' activities, may fall within Articles 56, 101 and 102 TFEU, since agent activities constitute an economic service consisting in connecting players or coaches with clubs for consideration.

Article 101 TFEU

Turning to Article 101 TFEU, the CJEU first confirmed that FIFA is an "association of undertakings" within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. It then went on to examine the challenged FFAR for whether they constituted restrictions by object or by effect.

On restrictions by object, the CJEU found that most of the challenged provisions, including those on multiple representation in Article 12(8)-(10) FFAR, the dynamic service-fee cap in Article 15(2) FFAR, the client-pays rule in Article 14(2)-(3) FFAR, the payment modality rules in Articles 15(1), 14(7) and 14(10) FFAR, and the presumption clause in Article 15(3)-(4) FFAR, do not constitute restrictions "by object", since they do not fix a rigid price ceiling, do not prevent price or quality competition, and are not obviously harmful to normal market functioning.

However, the CJEU found that Article 14(12)(a) FFAR, which strips an agent of unpaid remuneration earned on a prior transfer if the player subsequently moves to another club, even where the agent no longer represents the player and played no part in the new transfer, is inherently harmful to normal competition because the forfeiture is arbitrary, following the reasoning of Diarra (C-650/22, paragraphs 137–138). The CJEU also found that the no-approach rules in Article 16(1)(b) and (c) FFAR, which bar agents from contacting or contracting with clients already bound by an exclusive mandate, constituted a restriction "by object" insofar as they exempt agents bound by an exclusive mandate, who need not wait out the two-month window to renegotiate, thereby conferring an unjustified structural advantage on those already holding exclusive contracts (paragraph 158).

Leaving the determination of a restriction "by effect" of the remaining provisions to the referring court, the CJEU turned to the question of justification. It first observed that purely economic objectives such as correcting information asymmetries or lack of remuneration transparency cannot qualify as legitimate objectives "in the public interest" for the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception. By contrast, the CJEU found that establishing minimum professional and ethical standards for agents, protecting clients from unethical behaviour, protecting inexperienced players, and ensuring squad continuity during a sporting season can be recognised as legitimate non-economic objectives (paragraph 188). The CJEU thus also considered that FIFA, despite never having been mandated by public authorities to regulate in the public interest, was entitled to pursue such legitimate objectives in its regulations. Applying those standards, the CJEU concluded that:

• The multiple-representation restrictions and rules on remuneration, including the dynamic salary cap, appear appropriate to prevent conflicts of interest, the protection of unexperienced players and other objectives of a public interest and are not obviously disproportionate, subject to the national court verifying that no less restrictive alternative would be equally effective (paragraphs 192–195).
• The no-approach rules cannot be justified because FIFA's only identified non-economic aim, i.e., providing players a clear time window to choose an agent, is not pursued coherently or systematically, given that incumbent agents are wholly exempt from the restriction (paragraphs 212–213).
• The transparency obligations in Articles 16(2)(j) and 19(a)–(d) FFAR are in principle capable of justification, but Article 19(e) FFAR requiring disclosure of "details of all transactions involving player agents" goes beyond what is necessary since anonymised aggregate data would suffice, and is therefore excluded from the exception (paragraphs 216–218).

On the Article 101(3) TFEU exemption, the CJEU held that the no-approach rules of Article 16(1)(b), (c) failed at the first hurdle since their asymmetric application to incumbent agents means they generate no efficiency gain (paragraph 233).

Article 102 TFEU

The CJEU confirmed that FIFA holds a dominant position on the relevant markets arising from its binding regulatory, control and sanctioning powers, even though it is not itself economically active as an agent or on the labour market for players (paragraphs 241–244). According to the CJEU, an exclusionary abuse may be established where FIFA uses its regulatory powers to limit, affect or dictate the development of competition on connected markets, i.e., the services market for agents and the players' labour market, in a way that reflects the economic interests of clubs and leagues in its affiliated national associations (paragraph 265). In addition, an exploitative abuse may be established where a reasonably capable federation in a comparable position would have adopted regulations that, while equally capable of achieving the pursued objectives, would have affected the agents' interests in a significantly less prejudicial manner (paragraph 273). The detailed assessment of whether that was the case with the FFAR was left to the national court.

Article 56 TFEU

The CJEU found that the multiple-representation restrictions, the eligibility conditions for licensing, and the no-approach rules restrict the free provision of services within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU. According to the Court, the no-approach rules cannot be justified under Article 56 TFEU since contractual stability between agents and clients is a purely economic rationale and therefore insufficient; and the player-protection rationale is not pursued coherently because incumbent agents are exempted (paragraphs 306–309).

Article 6(1)(f) GDPR

Applying the three cumulative conditions of Article 6(1)(f) GDPR ((i) legitimate interest, (ii) necessity/data minimisation, and (iii) balance of interests), the CJEU found that the platform uploading obligations in Article 16(2)(j) FFAR appear compatible with the GDPR, since the data is proportionate to FIFA's legitimate interest in verifying compliance (paragraphs 330–343). However, Article 19(d) FFAR requiring disclosure of all sanctions regardless of severity, harm or time elapsed was considered to go beyond what is necessary and risks stigmatising agents disproportionately. Moreover, the CJEU held that Article 19(e) FFAR requiring full transaction-level remuneration data violates the principle of data minimisation under Article 5(1)(c) GDPR (paragraphs 370–383).

C-424/24 and C-425/24 – ZD and MI v Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio ("FIGC") and Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano ("CONI")

These joined cases arose from references by the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio (Regional Administrative Court, Lazio; "TAR Lazio") and concerned the compatibility with EU law of (i) disciplinary sanctions imposed by the Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (Italian Football Federation, "FIGC") on two former directors of Juventus FC, and (ii) Italian legislation restricting the powers of national administrative courts to review such sanctions. The former chairman and a former board member of Juventus were found to have participated in a system of artificial capital gains totalling in excess of EUR 60 million by making or approving financial and accounting statements that falsely presented a series of player transfers as independent transactions, whereas they were in fact exchange transactions, with the aim of evading applicable accounting standards and inflating Juventus's declared profits and assets for 2020 and 2021 (paragraph 19). In January 2023, the FIGC's "Federal Court of Appeal" imposed on each of the individuals a disciplinary sanction consisting of a 24-month prohibition on the pursuit of professional activities within the FIGC's competence (paragraph 24). That ban was subsequently extended worldwide by the FIFA Disciplinary Committee. The CONI's Sports Guarantee Board (Collegio di Garanzia dello Sport) of the Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (Italian National Olympic Committee, "CONI"), the supreme sports justice body in Italy, upheld the sanctions on appeal (paragraph 26). Both individuals brought an action before the TAR Lazio seeking primarily annulment and suspension of the sanctions. The TAR Lazio noted that, pursuant to Italian Law No 280/2003 as interpreted by the Italian Constitutional Court, it was required to dismiss those claims as inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction since Law No 280/2003 conferred exclusive jurisdiction to the above sports adjudicatory bodies to hear and determine applications for suspension and for annulment of disciplinary sanctions on individuals affiliated with Italian sports associations. The TAR Lazio submitted to the CJEU in essence the question whether Articles 6 and 19 TEU, in light of Article 47 of the Charter and Article 6 ECHR, required that domestic courts had the power to review such disciplinary sanctions, and whether Articles 45, 49, 56, 101 and 102 TFEU allowed the imposition of a 24-month sanction such as the one imposed on the two directors in the case at hand.

Admissibility and scope

The CJEU declared certain aspects of the reference inadmissible. The questions concerning Articles 49, 101 and 102 TFEU (freedom of establishment, competition law) and Article 6 TEU read in the light of Articles 47 to 49 of the Charter (legality of offences) were inadmissible because the referring court had not sufficiently explained the link between those provisions and the disputes (paragraphs 46-49). However, the questions concerning Articles 45 and 56 TFEU (freedom of movement for workers and freedom to provide services) were admissible because the sanctions were accompanied by requests for extension to UEFA and FIFA, giving the situation a cross-border dimension (paragraphs 50-52).

Articles 45 and 56 TFEU — Sports disciplinary sanctions and fundamental freedoms

The CJEU reaffirmed that private sports associations such as the FIGC, and public bodies such as CONI, must comply with Articles 45 and 56 TFEU when adopting rules relating to paid work or the provision of services by persons carrying out economic activities linked to sport, including club directors such as the applicants. The CJEU held that whether those bodies are governed by public or private law is irrelevant and that national recognition of their legal autonomy cannot exempt them from EU free movement law (paragraphs 55-58).
The CJEU held that while the adoption of provisions allowing the imposition of disciplinary sanctions is not per se contrary to Articles 45 and 56 TFEU, the actual imposition of a 24-month worldwide ban on professional activities on the applicants constituted an obstacle to their freedom of movement for workers or freedom to provide services in other Member States (paragraphs 63-66).

On possible justifications, the CJEU held that rules designed to ensure, through disciplinary sanctions, effective compliance with financial and accounting standards applicable to football clubs and with the accuracy of financial statements made or approved by their directors may be regarded as pursuing the legitimate public-interest objective of ensuring the proper conduct of sporting competitions (paragraph 72, citing Diarra, C 650/22, paragraphs 100-101, and CD Tondela, C-133/24, paragraph 96). According to the CJEU, financial balance underpins sporting balance, and artificial capital gains systems of the kind alleged in the present case distort competition between clubs through their direct impact on player transfers and team composition (paragraphs 73-74).

The CJEU left the proportionality assessment to the TAR Lazio, but provided detailed guidance. The referring court must verify (i) whether the adoption of the relevant provisions genuinely pursues the legitimate objective in a consistent and systematic manner, including through a coherent and comprehensive system of sanctions covering the various categories of conduct constituting the infringement (paragraph 77); (ii) whether the determination of sanctions on a case-by-case basis is subject to transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria (paragraph 78, citing Superleague, C-333/21, paragraph 257, and Diarra, C-650/22, paragraph 111); (iii) whether those criteria enable account to be taken of all relevant circumstances of each case (including nature, duration and gravity of the infringement); and (iv) whether the use of discretion by the sanctioning body is itself amenable to effective judicial review by reference to those same criteria (paragraph 79).

Based on the above analysis, the CJEU concluded that Articles 45 and 56 TFEU do not preclude national legislation allowing a national sports association to impose a temporary prohibition on the pursuit of professional activities on account of false financial and accounting statements, provided that (i) the relevant provisions pursue a legitimate non-economic public-interest objective, and (ii) they observe the principle of proportionality through consistent and systematic pursuit of that objective and through transparent, objective, non-discriminatory and judicially reviewable criteria.

Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter – Effective judicial protection and sports justice

The CJEU then addressed the core constitutional question of whether EU law precludes Italian legislation limiting the TAR Lazio's review powers to the award of financial compensation only, excluding any power to annul sanctions or grant interim relief. This question was answered solely in the light of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter (paragraph 82).

The Court reaffirmed its findings in Royal Football Club Seraing (C-600/23, paragraphs 75, 82 and 104) that effective judicial review requires the reviewing court to have jurisdiction over all relevant questions of fact and law, to be able to find infringements of EU law and draw all appropriate legal consequences, and to be able to grant interim relief pending a decision on the merits (paragraphs 85-92). Where the measure is a prohibition on the pursuit of professional activities, annulment to the extent required to remove the sanction from the legal order and bring its effects to an end is necessary to ensure the effective judicial protection of the individual (paragraph 91).

Importantly, although perhaps somewhat theoretically, the CJEU clarified that EU law does not require two levels of jurisdiction (paragraph 111). It is therefore sufficient that at least one body within the sports justice system that takes a decision at last instance qualifies as a "court or tribunal" within the meaning of EU law, meeting the following five cumulative requirements (paragraphs 113-121):

• it must offer genuine guarantees of independence and impartiality (external independence from the parties whose decisions it reviews, and internal impartiality as regards the subject matter of proceedings);
• it must be previously established by law as regards its existence, composition and organisation (a general and broad reference to sports association statutes and regulations does not suffice; the above aspects must be provided for by law);
• it must have a genuinely judicial rather than merely disciplinary function;
• the procedure before it must offer the requisite guarantees, in particular respect for the rights of the defence and the principle that parties should be heard; and
• it must be in a position to exercise effective judicial review of the sanction, including having the power to annul it and grant interim relief.

It follows from this that if one of these requirements is not met by the last-instance sports body (here, the Sports Guarantee Board of CONI), the TAR Lazio must itself be able to exercise full judicial review including annulment and interim relief. The CJEU noted that it did not have sufficient information to determine itself whether the Sports Guarantee Board meets these requirements, and remitted that assessment to the TAR Lazio. It did however note, with respect to the requirement of prior establishment by law, that a general reference to the statutes and regulations of CONI and the sports federations does not in itself satisfy that requirement (paragraph 117), casting doubt on the Italian sports justice system's compliance with EU law.

Outlook

Building on its jurisprudence developed in Superleague, the CJEU clarified in ROGON and RCC Sports that regulations by football federations dealing with the conduct of football agents who are not members of the federation squarely fall within the scope of EU competition and data protection law but may be legitimate. As regards FIFA's FFAR, the CJEU largely sided with FIFA on the question of whether those regulations were suitable, necessary, and proportionate to pursue legitimate objectives. The only exceptions were certain transparency obligations and the specific design of an aspect of FIFA's no-approach and remuneration rules.

The CJEU largely confirms the approach taken by the CAS in PROFAA v. FIFA and will guide decisions by domestic courts in EU Member States seized with challenges of the FFAR.
In CONI, the CJEU extended its sports law framework established in ISU, Superleague, and Seraing beyond competition law to encompass the right to effective judicial protection, confirming that sports associations' disciplinary powers are not immune from EU fundamental rights scrutiny. As it found in ISU and Seraing, in CONI the CJEU held that sports federations' disciplinary systems must be governed by transparent, objective and non-discriminatory criteria and that EU domestic courts must be able to exercise effective judicial control over decisions resulting from those systems.

The decisions adopted in ROGON, RRC Sports and CONI add to the growing body of CJEU case law concerning the relationship between sporting federation regulations and EU law. They stand in line with previous decisions adopted in ISU, Superleague, Diarra and Royal Football Club Seraing, and confirm that sports governance, whether regulatory or disciplinary, must comply with EU competition law, fundamental freedoms and the right to effective judicial protection. However, it is clear that the CJEU has now shown itself to be a bit more clement to FIFA and sports bodies in general. The latest judgments lean towards an Article 101 TFEU "by effect" approach and include welcome guidance on what constitutes a legitimate objective. This means that the relationship between EU law and sports regulations is entering a new phase, which we could call a phase of "symbiosis", as opposed to the more confrontational earlier phase.

_{1 CJEU, Rogon and Others, C-428/23, Judgment of 9 July 2026, available here.
2 CJEU, RCC Sports, C-209/23, Judgment of 16 July 2026, available here.
3 CJEU, CONI, Joined Cases C 424/24 and C 425/24, Judgment of 16 July 2026, available here.
4 CAS, Professional Football Agents Association (PROFAA) v. FIFA, CAS 2023/O/9370, Award of 24 July 2023, available here.}

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