U.S. Supreme Court closes the door on aiding-and-abetting liability under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
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On June 23, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court in Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I rejected attempts to sue defendants accused of aiding and abetting international human-rights abuses under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 ("TVPA").1 The Court held that neither statute creates a private right of action for aiding-and-abetting liability. And the Court clarified that courts may not recognize any new causes of action for violations of international norms under the ATS, stating that it was "clos[ing] the door" left open by the high court's first ATS decision over two decades ago.2
Legal background
The Judiciary Act of 1789, which established lower federal courts and granted jurisdiction over suits implicating foreign affairs, also authorized jurisdiction over civil violations by an "alien" "for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."3 This provision, now known as the ATS, was relatively unused for nearly two hundred years. In 1980, however, the Second Circuit permitted foreign plaintiffs to sue a foreign defendant under the ATS for allegedly engaging in torture, holding that the ATS permits federal courts to adjudicate rights recognized by international law.4
In 1991, Congress enacted the TVPA, which created a cause of action against "[a]n individual" for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing committed under authority or color of law of any foreign nation.5 Plaintiffs brought suits under the TVPA, but other plaintiffs whose claims fell outside the TVPA's reach continued to press suits under the ATS.
In 2004, the Supreme Court interpreted the ATS for the first time in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.6 The Court held that the ATS is a "jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action" beyond three offenses recognized at the time Congress enacted the ATS: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy (the so-called "Blackstone three").7 The Court in Sosa explicitly left open the possibility that there might be additional causes of action available under the ATS to enforce norms of international law, provided (1) those norms were "specific, universal, and obligatory," and (2) a plaintiff could show it would be prudent for a court to recognize such cause of action.8
Between deciding Sosa and Cisco, the Supreme Court agreed to hear three cases in which it analyzed the ATS. In each instance it rejected attempts to sue under the ATS, gradually narrowing the scope of viable claims. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Court held that the ATS does not permit claims for violations of the law of nations that do not "touch and concern" the United States.9 In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, the Court held ATS liability could not be imposed on foreign corporations.10 Most recently, in Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, the Supreme Court determined general corporate activity in the United States does not suffice to establish the requisite domestic connection.11
Relevant procedural history
Practitioners of Falun Gong, a religious movement in China, brought suit against Cisco Systems, Inc. and two individuals under the ATS and the TVPA, claiming Cisco and the individuals aided and abetted China's alleged human rights abuses by developing surveillance technology. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part.12 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that aiding-and-abetting liability was sufficiently definite and universal to be a form of liability under the ATS, and that prudential considerations did not preclude recognizing such liability.13 The Ninth Circuit additionally held that the TVPA permits claims against those who "aid and abet torture."14
The Supreme Court's decision
The Supreme Court confronted the question of whether the ATS or the TVPA permits a judicially created cause of action for aiding-and-abetting liability.
In addressing the ATS, the Court could have limited its analysis to determining whether Sosa's two-part test would permit a cause of action for aiding and abetting the alleged international law violations.15 Instead, the Court stated that it was opting to "close the door that Sosa cracked" by announcing a new categorical rule: courts cannot recognize any new causes of action under the ATS beyond the "Blackstone three."16 The Court explained that creation of new causes of action under the ATS necessarily carries adverse foreign policy consequences beyond the purview of courts, and that power rests with Congress alone.17 Three members of the Court — Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson — dissented from this conclusion.
As to the TVPA, the Court held that the cause of action created by the TVPA does not encompass aiding-and-abetting liability.18 The Court reasoned that the absence of any direct reference to secondary liability in the TVPA means that the TVPA does not authorize such liability, relying principally on the Court's precedent in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.19 Further, the Court determined that the TVPA's reference to one who "subjects" another to torture does not reach aiding-and-abetting liability.20 Only Justice Sotomayor dissented from this conclusion.
Take-aways and what's next
The Court's opinion in Cisco substantially restricts the reach of both the ATS and the TVPA. Plaintiffs alleging injuries arising from alleged human-rights abuses around the globe now face far steeper odds in attempting to fashion claims against corporate defendants with operations adjacent to, but not directly responsible for, the alleged injuries. Such claims will only be viable under the ATS if they can be shoehorned into one of the "Blackstone three" causes of action — violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. This provides clarity to multinationals operating in regions of the world where human-rights abuses may occur. This may be particularly consequential in the realm of out of court settlements: as the Court noted, while ATS plaintiffs rarely prevail in court, their claims may be resolved through multi million dollar settlements,21 which may decrease now that the underlying causes of action are less viable.
The Court's decision as to the TVPA carries equally important implications, reinforcing the principle that aiding-and-abetting liability is a congressional choice that courts may not supply by implication. Particularly in cases arising from conduct abroad that bear on foreign-relations considerations, the Court is signaling profound reticence to recognize secondary liability absent express direction from Congress. Together, the holdings substantially narrow the landscape for international human-rights litigation in U.S. federal courts.
1 609 U.S. ___ (2026).
2 Cisco, slip op. at 1.
3 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77.
4 See Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
5 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note.
6 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
7 Id. at 724; Cisco, slip op. at 4, 12.
8 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33.
9 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013).
10 584 U.S. 241, 272–74 (2018).
11 593 U.S. 628, 634 (2021).
12 Doe v. Cisco Sys., 73 F.4th 700, 746 (9th Cir. 2023).
13 Id. at 718, 720.
14 Id. at 744.
15 Cisco, slip op. at 7.
16 Cisco, slip op. at 1, 12.
17 Cisco, slip op. at 8–9.
18 Cisco, slip op. at 13.
19 Cisco, slip op. at 13 (citing Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994)).
20 Cisco, slip op. at 14.
21 Cisco, slip op. at 11 n.2.
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