On September 22, 2026, Denmark, Greenland, and the United States signed a security agreement (the “Greenland Treaty” or the “Treaty”) that, while fundamentally a defense pact amending the 1951 Defense Agreement between Denmark and the United States, also outlined an unprecedented trilateral foreign direct investment (“FDI”) screening framework for Greenland. An autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland had no national security foreign investment screening regime in place prior to the Treaty as neither the Danish FDI Act nor the EU FDI Regulation applied to Greenland. Greenland’s government had been considering a legislative proposal for FDI screening, but it was ultimately withdrawn in April 2026 amidst plans to further refine the legislation. While the Treaty must be ratified through parliamentary procedures in Greenland and Denmark before becoming binding under international law, the timing of which is indeterminate, it is likely to accelerate the establishment of a Greenlandic FDI regime.
Greenland FDI Screening under Article X
Under Article X of the Greenland Treaty, states or investors from states that are not NATO members, NATO partners, or EU member states (“Article X Investors”) may not obtain (i) control, (ii) significant influence, or (iii) access to non-public information that might constitute a threat to national security within Particularly Sensitive Sectors or Activities in Greenland. “Particularly Sensitive Sectors or Activities” includes (but is not limited to) critical infrastructure and the extraction of resources. If the Treaty parties agree that an investment from an Article X Investor does not constitute a threat to national security or public order, the investment prohibition may be lifted.
Analysis
While Greenland and Denmark will be responsible for operationalizing the Treaty’s foreign investment screening objectives under Article X, they must do so in close consultation with “relevant United States authorities and other partners.” These “relevant United States authorities” very likely include the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”). CFIUS, the US government interagency group charged with review of foreign investment in the United States, possesses the experience and intelligence acumen to assist the Treaty parties in determining the threat posed by Article X Investors. With “relevant United States authorities” weighing in on which Article X Investors and activities in Greenland constitute a threat to national security interests, the Treaty represents an unprecedented extraterritorial expansion of the United States’ authority over foreign investment review. As such, CFIUS may be directed to engage in Article X-related FDI screening in Greenland, for example through an Executive Order issued by President Trump.
Also unprecedented is the Treaty’s default position regarding Article X Investors. Any investor meeting the aforementioned criteria for FDI screening is a de facto threat to national security or public order until the Treaty parties decide otherwise. As such, the usual burden of proof required in CFIUS’s risk-based assessments will be reversed for Article X Investors; the reviewing authority need not demonstrate an unresolved threat to national security to prohibit or mitigate an Article X transaction, rather, the parties to such a transaction must be prepared to present a convincing case that the transaction will not create such a threat.
Implications for Investors
The exact contours of Greenland’s Article X FDI screening will be outlined in the months ahead. The Greenland Treaty sets out an unprecedented multilateral FDI regime that leaves many questions for the three nations’ legislative and regulatory bodies to resolve, including the scope of the consultation process between Denmark, Greenland, and the United States, the form and timeline of the implementing Greenlandic legislation and, at a more simplistic level, what it means to be “from” a state (e.g., whether a French investor using a Cayman entity for a critical infrastructure transaction in Greenland is “from” an EU member state).
Investors in Greenland that are clearly not from NATO member, NATO partner, or EU member states anticipating future transactions in critical infrastructure and resource extraction should be prepared to eventually seek the approval of Denmark, Greenland, and the United States. These additional approvals will add time and uncertainty to any transaction and should be accounted for in deal documents.
Moreover, such investors should keep current on both the intergovernmental procedures that Denmark, Greenland, and the United States institute as they operationalize the Treaty’s FDI screening objectives. Likewise, investors should keep track of the expansion of the sectors and activities included under the definition of Article X’s Particularly Sensitive Sectors or Activities.
White & Case means the international legal practice comprising White & Case LLP, a New York State registered limited liability partnership, White & Case LLP, a limited liability partnership incorporated under English law and all other affiliated partnerships, companies and entities.
This article is prepared for the general information of interested persons. It is not, and does not attempt to be, comprehensive in nature. Due to the general nature of its content, it should not be regarded as legal advice.
© 2026 White & Case LLP
